“In Love with EFA”

By Erwin Obermeier

3/22/2011 - I would like to tell you about the evolution of the Eurofighter Programme, the general problems we faced, the international games, the national hurdles, fights behind the curtains, different government, political and industrial interests.

I am going to tell you stories I experienced in the Eurofighter programme. I am not going to tell you fairy tails, although it might sometimes appear like jokes, no I will be serious. I am not going to blame anyone – at least not putting names to happenings, with may be a few exceptions.

If you listen carefully you might draw lessons to be learnt, and if I have the feeling you did not catch the important messages I am going to repeat them.

So I am going to share with you the experience I made over more than 20 years of my life when I was in love with EFA, the European Fighter Aircraft.

Short Cut: Evolution of the Eurofighter

The evolution process of the Eurofighter program has been underway for more than 30 years.

After a long pre-phase for assessment, studies and definition work the Main Development Contract was signed on 23rd November 1988. The major Production and Support contracts followed in 1998/99. In between the programme went through a major “re-orientation” and “re-baselining” in 1992 to 1994 and another re-baselining was done in 2004 en-route to agreement of a Tranche 2 production release. And indeed it is not finished yet being in the process of further reviews as part of the decision process for Tranche 3.

From the general tone of discussions around the Supplement 3 and Supplement 4 negotiations and re-baselining, it is apparent that many of those new in the programme (compared to its 22 years existence) fail to appreciate, or as a minimum fail to display appreciation of, some of the programme´s bases and history.

This lecture attempts also to counter some of this apparent misunderstanding, addressing particularly some industry key issues which seem rarely to be fully appreciated by some Customer Officials.

If the four Eurofighter Nations had wanted to purchase aircraft based on existing, low risk technology and capability they would not have undertaken the development of Eurofighter. In particular they chose to develop Eurofighter rather than purchase, say, a derivative of the US F-18, for a number of reasons – most to do with performance and capability, some to do with National industrial and security strategies.

The aircraft is thus not an “off the shelf” buy – it involves a challenging, high risk development programme, which has created a product with outstanding capabilities.

The programme is based on a level of collaboration and worksharing which was fundamental for its existence, but which introduces complications which can not easily be overcome.

The original Main Development Contract was structured as if it was a maximum price contract, but underneath it was something different in it self and between the Nations. In Germany clearly the MDC was a fixed price contract despite the significant industrial investment in technology demonstration with extremely ambitious specifications, industrial collaborative management and challenging workshare arrangements.

To state it right at the beginning, Eurofighter or what ever the name might be over the evolution period is not the product of a single individual, but by an international group of enthusiasts, well educated and clever engineers, controlled but not manipulated by commercials, legals and the top management.

Nevertheless one man made a major contribution to the layout and the configuration of the aircraft, and that was Wolfgang Herbst. He had ideas and visions, others turned it into innovations and others put the project into operational life.

It needs to be acknowledged that my lecture today is perceived from my personal and German point of view, which may well be slightly different from events observed by people from UK, Paris, Rome or Madrid. Every attempt, however, has been made to be objective. Nevertheless it is a fact that that EFA originated in Germany, more specific in Bavaria and very precise in Ottobrunn.

The military need for a modern Fighter Aircraft was established in 1974 and amplified in 1978 by the German Airforce. The analysis and prediction of modern air combat and the synthesis of the configuration concept is essentially unchanged since than.

The EFA represents an excellent example of engineering and technical management persistence. It is also an unique example of a weapon system derived from operations analysis and combat simulations. Operational pilots had from the beginning of the project the chance to evaluate the concept in manned simulation, which had proven that the German Air Force requirements were reflected in the outcome of the studies and evaluations.

Thus right from the beginning it was acknowledged that EFA is to be a fighter aircraft designed to its dedicated role in the predicted future environment.

EFA did benefit from flight test experience and flight test results of the British/Italian EAP and the US/German X-31 in particular. It has renewed the concept of the canard/delta wing configuration and almost every one of today’s high performance fighter designers is following this route – although with distinctive differences.

Initially there was industrial persistence and undebatable rational for a dedicated air defence aircraft which eventually lead to a conversion of the difficult process for international collaboration. At that time nobody in Europe was interested in a single role fighter aircraft, and nobody saw a need to fly in the supersonic flight regime.

Actually the roots for EFA go back as far as the late sixties, when the German Air Force had developed their F-104 successor formula, the Neues Kampf Flugzeug. The search for international collaboration the resulted in the Multi-Role-Combat-Aircraft (MRCA) TORNADO that turned out to be better operated in the ground attack role.

The German Air Force had to procure the F-4Phantom for Air Defence Missions in order to meet the NATO requirements. UK modified the TORNADO to become a “Defence Variant” which never could fulfill the actual requirements. There would not be an EFA in its present shape without an uncompromised military requirement and the dedicated technical solutions “home grown” in Germany.

The Initial Challenge

• German Air Force was under pressure for a new defence (fighter) aircraft to replace the interim F-4 Phantom

• If the new build up German aircraft industry was to survive a new development and production programme was required, following TORNADO

• There was a recognized potential threat – the new generation Warschow Pact fighter aircraft

• There was a worldwide market predicted in the late nineties to follow the US F-15, F-16, F-18 generation of fighter aircraft

• Some of the European countries were in a similar dilemma

• Some of the European countries need to keep the German activities under control, not to allow them too much freedom – remember, this are my perceptions

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