2014-08-30 By Ian Armstrong, Department of Political Science at Temple University
Roughly three weeks from now, the Scottish people will decide for themselves whether they wish to end the 307 year union that has bound them to the United Kingdom.
The Union formed in large part due to economic concerns following a failed excursion in colonialism that left Edinburgh bankrupt, and economic issues similarly dominate the contemporary discussion as the small nation edges closer to referendum. Given the immediately-felt economic effects of an independent Scotland, it is understandable that Scots have delegated so much of their attention to these matters.
However, the implications of Scottish independence on security and defense is a largely overlooked facet to be considered as Scotland’s four million registered voters head to the polls this September.
In particular, Scottish independence raises particular questions regarding the United Kingdom’s Trident nuclear program, NATO, and the capability of Britain to remain the greatest ally of the United States.
According to the Scottish Nationalist Party’s (SNP) white paper on independence — a hefty tome describing the Scottish Government’s vision of an independent Scotland — the small nation would function on the international stage in a similar manner to that of nearby Scandinavian countries.
An important aspect of this new philosophy entails a stern policy against nuclear weapons, which Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond has deemed as “an affront to basic decency” and unequivocally “inhumane.”
This, unfortunately for Westminster, poses a great challenge to the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, as it is accompanied by the quick and indefinite removal of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Trident from the Scottish coast.
As it turns out, the core of the United Kingdom’s nuclear force is housed on Scottish shores and in Scottish bases, and the price and time it would take for relocation places a great stress on the U.K. Government.
This has led to the assumption that, should Scotland become an independent state, the United Kingdom — or rather, what remains of the United Kingdom — would be unable to maintain its nuclear arsenal, subsequently terminating it all together.
Should Westminster relinquish its cherished nuclear status, Western security would endure a peculiar strain. The United States, already skeptical of Great Britain’s capability, might opt for another partner to fill the role as “greatest ally.” Tides are already shifting in this nature, with President Obama unable to choose between Paris and London in naming Washington’s closest overseas associate and former Defense Secretary Robert Gates questioning U.K. military capability.
It is accordingly not out of the realm of possibility that a United Kingdom without 58 Trident II D-5 missiles might fall secondary and bring the United States and France closer militarily.
Uncertainty remains as to how much of a tangible impact this would have on greater international security. Still, the United Kingdom’s reliance on the United States for a credible nuclear deterrent suggests that, outside of geo-strategic benefits that the Scotland-based nuclear weapons provide to the Alliance, business would likely continue as usual.
However, while many have argued that a “Yes” vote in September would lead to an end of the U.K. nuclear deterrence, the United Kingdom is likely more reluctant to scrap the Trident than assumed at first glance. As stated in the Scottish white paper, the United Kingdom seeks to project global power by deploying nuclear weapons. Westminster’s current coalition government is headed by a Conservative Party that — despite rejecting the internationally inflammatory U.S.-comradery of former PM Tony Blair’s Liberal Interventionism — is keenly aware of the importance of its nuclear deterrent to both NATO and its “special relationship” with the United States, a relationship closely connected to the maintenance of the British legacy.
Cameron’s conservatives adhere to the modern-day Tory principle of “euroskepticism”, which views the European Union as potentially restrictive of UK interests and inherently brings an emphasis towards the Atlanticist commitments with Washington and NATO, and thus the nuclear deterrent.
For all the talk of a new Conservative idealism in the United Kingdom, Cameron has so far asserted himself as a bastion of the traditional realism of his conservative ancestors, and is unlikely to allow Scottish independence to end the UK nuclear deterrent. This, of course, might change with the coming elections, though a hypothetical Labour government may well maintain the importance of nuclear weapons held by predecessors Blair and Brown.
In addition, the United States is able to exert more influence on London than it would like to admit.
It is undeniably in the United States’ best interest for the United Kingdom to continue reinforcing U.S. and NATO nuclear force.
If Scottish independence becomes a fact rather than a campaign, and if Westminster is seriously mulling the abandonment of its nuclear deterrent, Washington might impose the same kind of pressure that eventually coaxed the United Kingdom into the EU.
For Scotland’s part, the nation will enter into the Alliance as a non-nuclear member if the Scottish will sways towards independence.
The geographic position of Scotland entitles it to an important role in regional security. Still, given its present existence in NATO as a nation within the United Kingdom, an independent Scotland’s admission into the Alliance would have little effect outside of a continuation of the status quo.
However, the SNP has sworn to increase the Scottish contribution to NATO air force capabilities in the event of a “Yes” vote, as well as the creation of a second naval squadron solely for NATO and other excursions in international waters.
As the Scottish Government and First Minister Alex Salmond have indicated, it is certain that when the Scottish people vote for independence this September, they are also voting for the end of the U.K.’s Trident nuclear program as it currently exists.
But that is not to say that the Trident will cease to exist in its entirety.
Rather, an independent Scotland is likely to be trailed by the Trident’s relocation and possibly re-configuration, a prospect which — though costly — is conducive to the continuation of global stability.