Shaping Arctic Defense: Leveraging the Grid

2014-06-07 By Robbin Laird

The Arctic opening is a significant global event.

There are a number of key stakeholders in the opening up of the Arctic, with both convergent and conflictual elements at play.

Any time conflict is part of the equation, defense capabilities come into play, and they come into play in reinforcing so-called soft power as well. 21^st century military power is clearly interwoven with 21^st century security and diplomacy. It is not to be understood primarily as the sledgehammer but as a key contextual element integrated within diplomacy and security efforts to protect national operational sovereignty.

Because each of the key five stakeholders in the Arctic all have different perspectives as well with regard to even something as simple as “collaboration,” conflict can be built into a cooperative process.

But defense in the Arctic is a contextual capability.

To develop the Arctic requires shaping infrastructure for communications and situational awareness in an area with limited “traditional” infrastructure. It is about leveraging air breathing and space systems, and crafting appropriate land based towers and systems, which can create a grid for development and safety operations.

Shaping and Crafting an Arctic Grid

This is not a task for a year, but for the decade ahead. In an interview, which I did with Chris McLean and Richard Bray of Frontline Defence during a visit to Ottowa, we discussed the importance of shaping an Arctic grid.

Question: If one conceptualizes that a core challenge facing Canadian sovereignty is to provide for security and defense in the context of the Arctic opening, then major acquisitions should be made over time, and build out to that direction. 

In effect, the grid covering from Northern Europe to the Northern Pacific and over the Arctic – built with allied collaboration – is clearly a key challenge but also one which could focus Canadian force development and also defense and security investments.  It could also guide a way to think about public-private partnerships in the region, and tapping into the ongoing development of various Canadian civilian capabilities that are relevant to the Arctic opening.

Bray:  That makes a great deal of sense, and could focus our attention on the ISR and C2 streams, which we need to build out over time.

I’m not convinced we understand what the data from surveillance platforms and other tools will be like, the challenges that such a data stream will present to the operator, or the opportunities it will present to the commander.  It’s like being given access to a giant database without the software tools to extract meaning.

As it gathers and sifts more data (and faster), will it be like antilock brakes, allowing you stay 30 feet closer to the vehicle ahead of you? Or will it allow you to complete the mission in a completely different way?

These kinds of assets allow you to get yourself deeper and faster into a situation.  So, if the speed of engagement and the amount of data being acquired could quickly become overwhelming without effective software.

The challenge will be to have the data, to verify the data against cyber spoofing, and to integrate enough of the data in order to have the kind of decision-making necessary in a fluid environment.

Bray and I continued to focus on the grid in a later piece on Front Line Defence.

A key requirement for Canada will be to shape a grid to cover the full geography, including her Arctic interests. If one conceptualizes that a core challenge facing Canadian sovereignty is to provide for security and defense in the context of the Arctic opening, then major acquisitions should be made over time, and built out to that direction.

In effect, the grid covering from Northern Europe to the Northern Pacific and over the Arctic – built with allied collaboration – is clearly a key challenge but also one which could focus Canadian force development and also defense and security investments. It could also guide a way to think about public-private partnerships in the region, and tapping into the ongoing development of various Canadian civilian capabilities that are relevant to the Arctic opening.

And in a recent discussion with Danish Rear Admiral (Retired) Henrik Kudsk, this experienced Arctic operator, highlighted the importance of building the grid:

Question: What is the most basic need to operate in the Arctic in the decade ahead as the Arctic opening proceeds?

Kudsk: Clearly, the most basic need is to build out ISR and, in effect, build out a communications and sensor grid to provide for the kind domain awareness most central to development, safety and security in the region.

And this is doable, because compared to other regions; there is significantly less traffic and human habitation.  This makes it easier to identify the anomalies and threats, which need to be monitored.

You have a pristine environment up there where human activity is relatively visible, when compared to the rest of the world, where you can disappear in a crowd. But you still need systems, which can help you, see over vast distances and in difficult communications conditions.

For example, I believe that leasing capability from the Canadian Radarsat system might make sense for Denmark as we build out the grid, which we will need to operate in the region as it opens up.

There are major challenges for communication systems in the region as well.

Today, most systems are designed to operate always on and always connected.  This is impossible in the Arctic where you have only windows where you can communicate, not a constant capability to do so.

Defining the Challenges

An exercise sponsored by Denmark last year highlighted the shortfalls facing Arctic safety and security and the need to shape an operational grid.

Search and Rescue Exercise Greenland Sea 13 ran from Sept. 2 to Sept. 6, and was hosted by Denmark near Ella Island off Greenland’s east coast. There were several international participants in the exercise, including Canada, Iceland, the US, and the Norwegians with their Joint Rescue Coordination Center at Bodoe. The scenario focused on a real world problem, namely a cruise ship in distress with the need to both search and rescue passengers and crew.

According to the Danish report:

The scenario involved a medium-sized cruise ship the “ARCTIC VICTORY” (simulated by HDMS VAEDDEREN) with 250 passengers and crew, which first went missing in the Greenland Sea and later ran aground in King Oscar’s Fiord off Ella Island, followed by an explosion and resulting fires on board. For this exercise, operations were minimized during the night due to insufficient EXCON personnel for 24-hour operations.

The exercise setup called for a multitude of tasks in the operational response, including maritime search and rescue; fire fighting at sea; evacuation by sea and air; deployment of emergency medical personnel, fire and rescue personnel, and police registration personnel; use of a specialized search team with cameras and listening equipment to locate missing persons below deck; triage and emergency medical treatment by doctors and paramedics at sea and on shore; establishing a reception facility for evacuees on land, establishing guard duty to protect evacuees against the possibility of attacks by polar bears; continuous updating of the SAR service’s Persons On Board (POB) list and the police’s Disaster Involved Registry (DIR) with identities and medical status of evacuees, etc, etc.

All in all, the intent was to closely simulate the many challenges of coordinating a multinational search and rescue effort in the high Arctic.

Although the report highlighted successes, the evident shortfalls were significant. Because situational awareness is difficult, communications episodic and the ability to reach the right point to make a difference with the right rescue means, the challenge to do “normal” S and R is formidable.The exercise demonstrated how difficult it is to do “routine” S and R. The gaps in the ability of the nations to work together, the absence of enough S and R platforms, the real shortfall in SA, and the pot holes associated with communication were all highlighted in the after action report.

And a recent US assessment of the challenges facing the USCG dealing with Alaska and the Arctic highlighted similar shortfalls.

According to Heath C. Roscoe, Paul F. Campagna, and David McNult:

The authors developed a list of probable incidents/events from Coast Guard SAR historical documents the may require a U.S. safety response in the future. Although not all-encompassing, the 10 potential scenarios are listed most to least likely. The wide array demonstrates the fragility of the Arctic and the scenarios serve as driving factors as the United States considers future capacities and capabilities:

• Medical Evacuation/nonmaritime medical transports (currently 3 percent of all SAR cases)
• SAR operation small maritime vessel (fishing/recreational)
• small oil spill/discharge in the Chukchi or Beaufort seas
• downed aircraft (small passenger) SAR mission
• vessel runs aground, caught in ice, or sinks
• emergency barge resupply for North Slope community
• large oil spill from drilling operation
• large oil spill from tanker operating in Arctic
• mass rescue operation (MRO) downed jetliner
• MRO cruise ships/ferries.

Despite assuming a lower position on the list due to probability of occurrence, MROs would be nearly impossible to carry out given currently assessed response shortfalls.

For example, if an MRO or large oil spill incident occurred on the North Slope of Alaska, the closest Federal SAR and oil spill response is 820 miles away in Kodiak.

Current oil spill response capabilities include four Spilled Oil Recover Systems equipped on 225-foot buoy tenders home ported in Alaska at Kodiak, Sitka, Cordova, and Homer; an aerial dispersant delivery system staged in Anchorage as a backup to commercial venders; and Federal on-scene coordinators located in Juneau, Anchorage, and Valdez with incident management expertise and limited prepositioned oil response equipment.

Given these sparse and widely dispersed assets, the long-term environmental impacts of a spill in the Arctic Ocean could prove cataclysmic.

ISR capabilities, communications systems, search and rescue assets, unmanned and manned systems of various sorts, appropriate ships and finding ways to connect these assets in a very difficult region to do connectivity is the challenge facing developmental, safety, security or defense activities.

Defense as a Contextual Capability

The shaping of the grid will be done primarily for developmental, safety and security issues. But shaping a grid will lay down a foundation on which appropriate defense systems can operate to protect the sovereignty of key states and their national territories.

Given the importance of the High North, for Russian nuclear operations, the growth in military traffic through the Northern passages, inevitable sovereignty disputes, the high probability the Russians will build flexible forces at the top of the world in order to influence events either in Europe or Asia, defense or military considerations are built into the Arctic opening.

An element of the Russian defense capability, which might be deployed for Arctic missions, could be the venerable Mig-31.

According to the TTU French defense newsletter in its May 12, 2014 edition.

It appears that command of the air and space forces is about to extend the MiG 31, which was to be withdrawn from the fleet in 2028…..

As new tensions appear in the Arctic, as a result of climate change, Moscow has rediscovered the capability advantages of the MiG 31 and could, as a deterrent, redeploy its 12 squadrons of Foxhounds, as they are known in NATO nomenclature, near the North Pole.

This would be not only to protect its strategic resources, since 90 per cent of Russian oil is found there, but also to seat its authority over new navigation routes which, by offering shorter journeys, will draw maritime traffic towards Russiaʼs north coasts and offer Moscow an unprecedented means of geostrategic pressure.

In addition, as part of a large-scale air defense exercise involving 100 aircraft, some MiG 31s intercepted a cruise missile launched from a Tu-95MS strategic bomber above the Telemba military ground.

But given the central importance of the kind of cooperation necessary to provide for development, safety and security in the Arctic, the region will not be primarily defined by defense systems, but the Grid will enable them and participate in security missions in any case.

And with the addition of new capabilities, such as fighters, the question will be how do they contribute to and live off the grid while doing their missions? An advantage of an ISR-enabled fighter is obvious: it can live off and contribute to the grid.

Also, training and operational missions will allow the pilots to provide real time information back to military, security and various policy officials about anomalies or threats, which may need to be dealt with. According to Ed Timperlake, “The advantage of a man in the loop generated by fighter operations is to contribute rapidly available information and judgments about what an overall Arctic policy process might need to deal with in the near term.”

My own look at what I would consider to be an Arctic-enabled fighter can be seen in the briefing slides below. Key elements would include, being ISR and communications capable with an ability to operate as an airborne command center to support both security and defense operations.

Earlier, I discussed the nature of an Arctic enabled fighter with a Canadian Air Force pilot with significant Arctic experience. In that piece, published by Front Line Defence, I looked at the F-35 and the Artic mission sets.

I started with the assumption that building an Arctic C2 and ISR grid to cover Canada’s needs across the High North is a central and strategic task.

Over time, the F-35 will clearly become a potential contributor to this effort. Norway has bought the F-35 and is shaping its fleet with the Arctic in mind. The U.S., Japan, and most probably Denmark are among the allied states that will operate F-35s with Arctic security and defence in mind.

There are two key considerations. The first is the emergence of a 21st century fleet. Pacific allies are buying the F-35 and will be looking to shape integration.

The second is the nature of the combat systems. The F-35 systems make it a C2 and ISR aircraft, notably when the planes are considered as a deployed grid able to cover significant space. For instance, in the 2011 Northern Edge exercise, its radar mapped the maritime surface of 500 square miles. According to a report released by the Joint Program Office at the time: F-35 combat systems “searched the entire 50,000 square-mile Gulf of Alaska operating area for surface vessels, and accurately detected and tracked them in minimal time.”

During recent interviews with General Hostage (the Air Combat Commander), General Jacoby (the NORAD/NORTHCOM commander), Lt. General Jouas (the 7th USAF Commander), Lt. General Robling (MARFORPAC), and most recently with General Hawk Carlisle (the AFPAC commander), I was able to discuss the emerging role of the F-35 fleet and how it figured into their considerations for the future of air operations. Each, in one way or another, emphasized the key role the combat systems of the fleet would play in cueing up other military and security assets for the full spectrum of missions.

Communication linkages is a ­crucial aspect, not only for combat but for security operations as well. Recently, in the Philippines, the USMC brought its Osprey and KC-130J package as the initial force in shaping relief efforts. But the only communications they had was the Commanding Officer’s Blackberry. The Marines emphasized that their F-35Bs will have the mapping, ISR and communications capability crucial to their full range of operations – something they do not have now.

Billie Flynn, former Canadian Air Force fighter pilot, is now an F-35 test pilot with Lockheed Martin. Flynn started flying the CF-18 some 30 years ago and retired after commanding 441 squadron and leading the Canadian task force involved in Kosovo.

Given the importance of CFB Cold Lake in any Arctic strategy, Flynn’s operational experience is suggestive of the way ahead if F-35s become the mainstay Canadian aircraft. “Because the F-35 is clean in design and operation, it goes further and stays longer in the airspace. This allows it to patrol the Arctic without the same level of tanker support that the CF-18 requires. It can stay over the Arctic area of operation to be able to see at distance,” he says.

“It will allow the Canadian Air Force to patrol areas with fighter aircraft in way they could not do before. As the CO of 441, to fly out of Cold Lake for Arctic ­sovereignty missions required a significant logistical support just to operate in the areas crucial for the mission. With 18,000 pounds of fuel on board the F-35, the pilots will operate longer and at greater range than with the CF-18.”

We then discussed impacts of combat systems for the Arctic sovereignty mission set. “Stealth allows the F-35 to patrol with impunity. The combination of 360° multi-spectral sensor, sensor fusion shared information among members of the network allows the F-35 to serve as a key node to a much broader grid than anyone would have thought possible with a tactical fighter,” he asserts.

Flynn believes that patrolling and guarding Canadian resources in the Arctic will be done on a order of magnitude more effectively with the F-35 than any legacy fighter platform. “The F-35 sees in depth and breadth and across many electronic spectrums as well. It can see hundreds of miles around itself and does so in a moving space as it operates. The pilot is in a shared sensor space – he is not operating as a unit of a squadron defined by wingmen.”

Thinking forward to the Arctic Grid concept, a key challenge will be to factor in the F-35 as a fleet (Canadian and allied) in shaping the other ISR and C2 elements.

“You will not use the F-35 as a classic tactical aircraft,” explains Flynn. “It will be part of the grid you are talking about. As the Canadian military determines how to deal with its evolving Arctic mission, it will be crucial to understand the F-35 fleet impact and to then sort out what else is needed and how other systems can be most effectively used. It is a definitional asset, not simply an additive platform. It is a foundational element for reshaping the approach to Arctic sovereignty.”

Re-working the Defense of Greenland

A clear example of working though new relationships among the elements of the grid and defense assets will be in shaping a new approach to Greenland defense.

The Russian actions in Ukraine have reminded Europe of the direct defense of Europe challenge.  And part of Europe is clearly the Arctic and securing their Arctic interests during the Arctic opening.

And a key element of managing that opening is safety, security and defense, with the Russians as a key player, either in working the problem collectively or positioning for dominance.

The Ukraine events have gotten the attention of the Nordic states with regard to the second might be more important in the near and mid-term than the former.  Indeed, discussions in Denmark have highlighted growing concern with how best to deal with both Baltic and Arctic security and defense.

A recent comment by the Prime Minister of Iceland highlights the concerns:

Russia’s actions in Ukraine could cause problems for international cooperation in the Arctic, says Iceland’s prime minister. Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson said Russia’s strong-arm tactics in its former satellite could make it harder for the eight nations on the Arctic Council to reach agreements at a time when the region faces a series of critical issues.

This has a ripple effect, even though the actual events are far from the Arctic,” said Gunnlaugsson, in Edmonton on a trade mission. “Clearly, it has made many players in the Arctic quite worried about developments and whether they might be a sign of what is to come.”

What the Ukrainian dynamics have underscored is the need for practical actions to bolster Baltic security and defense as well as that of the Arctic.

From the Nordic standpoint, one simply has to look at the map, to understand the relationship of Russia to both Baltic and Arctic concerns.

With regard to the Arctic, a key concern for Denmark clearly is the development of Greenland and the defense and security of the country as well.

What makes Greenland a tricky issue is that Denmark is responsible for security and defense, yet Greenland is quasi-independent, and clearly aspires to see development and the enrichment of what is essentially a poor country.

A small population, which lives in the perimeter of the country, largely occupies Greenland and yet the opening of the country to mining is bringing with it significant outside influence, which can clearly disrupt the security and defense situation for Greenland as well.

Certainly, one of the outside powers which concerns Denmark most is China, and its engagement in the opening of Greenland.

A recent conference held by the Centre for Military Affairs in Copenhagen focused on the Chinese challenge in the Arctic.

As one contributor to the conference put it:

In Greenland, big scale mining in need of foreign investments are not only seen as a possibility for obtaining economic growth and the maintenance of welfare systems in Greenland, but also as one of the few possibilities for obtaining a sustainable economy, which is a prerequisite for obtaining political independence that is the promise on the Self-Government Act adopted in 2009 by the Greenlandic and the Danish parliaments after a Greenlandic referendum in which about 75 percent of the voters voted yes.

This could, of course, cause alarm in Denmark, and raise questions concerning whether Denmark, eventually, will lose the current arrangement with Greenland as part of the Danish community of the realm – if Greenland decides for independence.

So, the issue of China’s Arctic aspiration in the Danish political debate is clearly intertwined with the issue of the future of the Danish-Greenlandic relationship.

Conference_report_China’s_Arctic_aspirations

But more broadly, there is the defense challenge, which is a Danish, NATO, and a US challenge.

Greenlanders live in the more temperate coastal areas; the rest of its two million sq km are covered in ice.

The US has had a presence in Greenland and took primary responsibility for the defense of Greenland throughout the Cold War.  Yet the uncertainties of US policy, more generally and in the Arctic, as well as the dynamics of the Danish-Greenland relationship create an open-ended problem of how the security and defense of Greenland will be conducted in the period of the Arctic opening.

In an interview in 2011 with Admiral Wang, now the head of the

The Admiral highlighted the possibility of Canadian, US, and Danish defense collaboration at the Thule Air based turning into an Arctic hub.

Russia has a very clear strategy closely connected with their approach towards energy policy.  They were building significant resources for their Arctic strategy.  He noted that the Russians bought two of the Mistral class helo carriers for deployment by the Northern Fleet and would be ice hardened.

The Russians had reorganized existing forces to create two new Arctic brigades, which made a strategic point.

The United States had a strategy but few resources.  Indeed, the strategy was signed the last month of President Bush’s Administration.  There is a series resource gap on the US side, and the allied countries in the Arctic look to the US to have resources, including C4ISR capabilities.

A possibility was to shape a hub in Northern Greenland at the Thule air base to provide for such capabilities.

In an excellent overview to the challenge for the development and defense of Greenland, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, the head of the Centre for Military Studies, provided a way to conceptualize the problem.

The problem really is about the development of Greenland, the role of the local government in that development, the relationship between Denmark and Greenland in combining greater autonomy for Greenland while providing for defense and security and what role the US will have in the overall process.

In other words, the challenge will be to sort out in PRACTICAL terms how Greenland will be defended in the presence of greater outside powers influence through the mining companies, the dynamics of change between Denmark and Greenland, and the uncertainty about US policies and capabilities for Greenland defense and Arctic operations.

And in such a situation certainly, the Russians will play a role with a significant possibility of driving wedges among the players. The sort of game they have played in Georgia and Ukraine or Syria for that matter would seem to fit a Russian opportunity in the High North.

According to Rasmussen:

The military remains a Danish responsibility after the 2009 self-rule legislation. The Danish military presence in the Arctic is of a different nature than the American one, however. The Danish military presence relates to the internal affairs of the territory rather than to the geopolitical position of Greenland.

The United States military is stationed in Greenland for purely geopolitical reasons, and the bulk of the US forces left when these concerns could be dealt with differently and at lower cost. The Danish military presence was and has remained primarily a naval presence. The Royal Danish Navy is also the national coast guard and naval operations in the Arctic were primarily coast guard operations like Search and Rescue (SAR) and fishing inspection.

Apart from this the air force operated a few platforms for logistics and surveillance and the army operate the SIRIUS PATROL – a ranger unit that patrols the Northern territories by sled. The increasingly independent-minded government in Nuuk has been making demands of the Danish military in ways, which would never have been done of the US military.

With prospect of more traffic in the territorial waters and the need to more inspections following from prospecting etc. the call from greater resources have been heard from the military40 and politicians in Greenland, like the Greenlandic MP Sara Olsvig who argued that an increased defence presence was needed because ‘the minerals – including radioactive material – must be secured’

‘Greenland is a part of the Kingdom which will play an important global role in the future,’ defence minister Nick Hækkerup noted in 2012. Minister Hækkerup added that he believed operations in the Arctic would be ‘one of the areas were we will use more money in years to come’.

Rasmussen added that:

A key interest of the United States in Greenland will be the stability that allows access and which prevents Greenland from being a problem in Canada-US relations. As Natalia Loukacheva notes, the most important security relationship between the Inuit in Nunavut and Greenland is not with Ottawa or Copenhagen but with Washington.

For Canada and Denmark the risk of decoupling is part of the geopolitics of the Arctic. Perhaps one reason why the State Department did not grant the ambassador his wish for an office in Nuuk was that the United States might be more interested in Greenland remaining a part of the Kingdom of Denmark, if Greenland independence would create problems within the Canadian federation, this would lead to demands for more independence to Nunavut. The fact that military forces in the Arctic have come from the outside has made it obvious for the Inuit to focus on human security concerns, the fact that military forces has been non-indigenous have reflected the fact that the areas have been governed from the outside and with a geopolitical importance that attracted foreign forces.

The ambition of independence puts these geopolitical questions on Greenland’s political agenda for the first time.

The geopolitics of Greenland dictates that Greenland can only be a sovereign, independent country by providing for stability and control over its own territory in a way that ensures the United States of access and that the access of potentially hostile powers can be confidently denied. This is an issue anyone arguing for the independence of Greenland from the Kingdom of Denmark will have to be able to address.

Greenland_Geopolitics_Globalisation_and_Geopolitics_in_the_New_North

And in another Danish paper which considers the evolving Greenland agenda, Admiral Nils Wang, one of Denmark’s leading Arctic experts and head of the Royal Danish Defence College, argues along with one of his colleagues, that the quest for sovereignty by Greenland will occur in a tough period where pressure from the outside is going up dramatically.

As a result, Greenland might well consider working with Denmark closely on sorting out security and defense arrangements as the Arctic opening unfolds.

In the paper, Dr. Damien Degeorges and Rear Admiral Nils Wang argue the following:

Greenland achieved self-rule in 2009, just as the Arctic was starting to draw global attention. This was by no means the beginning of the state-building process, but an important step on a long journey towards increased sovereignty and independence.

The big challenge for Greenland is to achieve economic independence and become a respected sovereign actor in the international system, capable of standing up to other regional actors such as Norway, Canada, Russia and the United States. After nearly 300 years of economic and political dependency on Denmark, economic independence now seems to be achievable within a foreseeable future.

However, the growing international interest for the Arctic in general is compounding the challenges for Greenland’s small population and its plans to develop a robust state apparatus, with the necessary institutional volume.

Greenland and the New Arctic.

In short, working the specifics of how the Greenland defense and security challenge is worked with Denmark, the Nordics, the United States and other Europeans is a key part of the future of Western defense and security.

It is not simply about an abstract Arctic security problem.

It is integral to the evolution of Europe and of NATO in the years ahead as wealth and influence shift North within Europe as a whole.

This is the fourth of a four-part series:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-arctic-opening-co-opetition-in-the-high-north/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-russian-dynamic-in-the-arctic-strategic-positioning/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-russian-approach-to-the-high-north-shaping-a-way-ahead/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/shaping-arctic-defense-leveraging-the-grid/