The ARG: A Core National Capability

The Amphibious Ready Group: A Core National Capability

An Interview With Colonel “Ozzie” Osborn, Former 15th MEU Commander

04/20/2011 – Second Line of Defense during its interview with Colonel “Ozzie” Osborn discussed the flexibility of the Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit team. Colonel Osborn provided an overview of capabilities now in play with a disaggregate/distributed Ops ARG/MEU  and the potential expansion of those capabilities with the addition of new enablers.  These enablers are the F-35B Lighting II, the MV-22 Osprey, the CH-53K Super Stallion, the LPD-17 and robotics.  Colonel Osborn was the 15th MEU commander during its last operational deployment.


Harrier Landing on USS Kearsarge During Operation Odyssey Dawn After Night Operation

Credit: USN Visual News Service, March 20, 2011

 

Colonel Osborn: Basically, I’m a CH-46 helicopter pilot in terms of background. I’ve deployed both on the west coast and east coasts.  And I started off with everything from the Alaska oil cleanup to Desert Shield/Desert Storm to Operation Iraqi Freedom.  I flew missions during the race riots in LA back in the early 90s.I was in Somalia in 93/94; we got there 14 days after Black Hawk Down and spent four and a half months in Mogadishu.

SLD:   That’s a lot of time.

Colonel Osborn: It was a very long time.  I have flown missions in support of the liberation of Kosovo and in OIF I.  In OIF II, I was an ACE commander for 24th MEU in Iraq and then came back to the fleet as a MEU commander. I’ve done just about everything you can do, amphibious operations wise, and a term that we’ve kind of coined now- which is Sea-based Expeditionary Operations. The concept now is that you take the seabase, and whether the sea base is a big deck carrier, or whether it’s an LHA, or an LHD, or it could be something as small as an LCS.  It’s a sea base and you conduct expeditionary ops from that base.

SLD:   You are therefore operating in modular terms and you’re tailoring to the mission.

Colonel Osborn: We focus upon multi-mission capabilities.  Every platform out there has to be multi-mission.  It cannot be single-mission. That doesn’t mean that you have to be able to do every mission 100-percent.  But you need to be able to do a significant percentage of every mission that’s out there. With the last deployment of the 15th MEU, I went out completely old school.  I had CH-46s, which is the core for the ACE, I had AV8B Harriers, a mix of Night Attack and Radar Birds.  I had Whiskey Cobras, I had November Hueys, and I had three of them.  I had CH-53 Echoes. The only new piece of gear in the ACE that we had, really two new pieces of gear, we were the first ones to go out with an ACE COC, a CapSet for the ACE.  I could actually send the ACE to a separate environment, and they’ve got their own command and control capability.  And I had KC-130Js, I had two of those assigned to the MEU. Every one of my major subordinate elements, my MSEs, the BLT, the CLB and the ACE, had the ability to operate as an independent command and control headquarters, separate from the MEU and independent from the ships.

We focus upon multi-mission capabilities.  Every platform out there has to be multi-mission.  It cannot be single-mission. That doesn’t mean that you have to be able to do every mission 100-percent.  But you need to be able to do a significant percentage of every mission that’s out there. With the last deployment of the 15th MEU, I went out completely old school.  I had CH-46s, which is the core for the ACE, I had AV8B Harriers, a mix of Night Attack and Radar Birds.  I had Whiskey Cobras, I had November Hueys, and I had three of them.  I had CH-53 Echoes. The only new piece of gear in the ACE that we had, really two new pieces of gear, we were the first ones to go out with an ACE COC, a CapSet for the ACE.  I could actually send the ACE to a separate environment, and they’ve got their own command and control capability.  And I had KC-130Js, I had two of those assigned to the MEU. Every one of my major subordinate elements, my MSEs, the BLT, the CLB and the ACE, had the ability to operate as an independent command and control headquarters, separate from the MEU and independent from the ships.

We brought extra SWAN-Ds, which are our new satellite link systems.  We also had a small suitcase portable type satellite communication systems – BGANs.  And we brought extra generators. We really went out with a distributed ops mentality. As 24th MEU ACE in OIF II, I had half of my command at Camp Kalsu 55 miles away from the main ACE command at Al Taqaddum in a stand alone position.  I had another chunk of my command at Al Assad.  So distributed Ops was not new for me. But it was distributed ops the hard way; the separate chunks of the commands had no Combat Operations Center (COC) capability.

All we had were laptop computers that we normally had in Garrison.  But we had no radios and no telephones.  I didn’t even have an Iridium phone as an ACE commander.  I had no way to hook up any of the nets or anything like that.  And so, we had to beg, borrow, steal and tag in on other assets – not the way you want to operate . I would never again want to go out with a unit that could be distributed and not have the ability to link.  So, when we started really looking hard at 15th MEU, that was one of the core items we focused on.  I wanted to be able to do distributed ops across as much of the battle space as I could.

SLD:   So, you visualized the technology necessary to accomplish that.  Now, with the evolution of the V-22 and maybe the K, and the ability to drop in further, farther, faster, that just comes together?

Colonel Osborn: It absolutely comes together, and it’s even bigger than that.  We’ve classically defined the littorals as about 200 miles but the littorals are as deep as you can go.  The ARG/MEU had assets that were operating in Northern Pakistan with the operational airbase 650 nautical miles feet dry.

SLD:   And we kick around the term enduring littoral operations. Increasingly, you’re going to have to get engaged for counter-piracy and you might move to something else.  And you may need to assemble assets that are going to be there for 60-90 days. So now, the question is how do you manage such a situation?

Colonel Osborn: One of the questions that keeps getting asked to me was how do you do C2?  And how do you manage this?  Well, you don’t.  And that’s the fundamental thing.  Get away from the idea that you have to manage everything. You’ve got to get to the point where you operate with trust tactics. But you’ve also got to get to the point where you can shift assets to the greatest need, and you can balance the risk versus the gain.  If I pull an asset off from here, can I shift it to there?  And can I get it there quickly.  That’s where the range, speed, and payload of the V-22 and the KC-130J come into play — and in my case, it was KC-130J.  That’s how I really expanded my battle space. If I’d had V-22s, I would’ve been able to do the mission easier, faster and with less risk.  That’s just a fundamental bottom line.  You can draw the charts and you can actually show that.  Speed, range, and payload become overwhelming factors when you are operating well over 200 nautical miles from the seabase.

(…) how do you do C2?  And how do you manage this?  Well, you don’t.  And that’s the fundamental thing.  Get away from the idea that you have to manage everything. You’ve got to get to the point where you operate with trust tactics. But you’ve also got to get to the point where you can shift assets to the greatest need, and you can balance the risk versus the gain.  If I pull an asset off from here, can I shift it to there?  And can I get it there quickly.  (…) You can draw the charts and you can actually show that.  Speed, range, and payload become overwhelming factors when you are operating well over 200 nautical miles from the seabase.

SLD:   Well now, if we just hover on this point, when you have the Osprey and the F-35B, it’s going to affect the decision-making choices you’re going to be able to make.

Colonel Osborn: Absolutely, especially in how intelligence impacts your decisions. The capabilities of the Osprey and F35 dramatically expand the real and potential battlespace for the ARG/MEU. We have for years, gone with the idea that we do intelligence operations where we collect and process intelligence.  Mission and intel drive the operation based upon the capability of the platforms you are using.  We need to do operational intelligence, which is I need to know everything’s that going on. But what I need to know from an operator’s point of view is I need to know the intelligence that impacts this mission.  And so, I need to be able to take that intelligence and not turn it into some PowerPoint brief that sits up at the head shed.  That intel has to be  given to the shooter.

SLD:   That’s very Marine, Colonel.

Colonel Osborn: As an example, I wanted live video feed during the counter-piracy mission where we took the MV Magellan Star back from the Somali pirates.  I wanted live video feed for overall command and control, but more importantly to the Assault Force Team Leads in the boats.  When they are about 500 meters out, heading in to take that ship down, they need control of the ISR asset and the ability to see the target.

SLD: It’s basically a flying telescope.

Colonel Osborn: That’s exactly what it is.  And it’s a flying telescope that has three-dimensional view.

SLD:   So essentially, what you’re describing is trying to have modular C2, appropriate to the command level.  We’re trying to evolve ISR that’s also appropriate to the command level or operationally.  And if we can get to this point where we’re delivering to the tip of the spear.  Because we don’t care about the guys hundreds of miles back or somewhere in Nevada, are really smart about overall situational awareness.  It’s irrelevant.

Colonel Osborn: That’s right. In higher-level command, I got it.  You’ve got to have the big battle picture. But when you’re looking at where it really gets down to the success of the mission, especially in the modern battlefield environment where one single sailor, soldier, airman or Marine shoots the wrong dog or the wrong water buffalo, and it makes international news, it changes the entire strategic picture. So what you’ve got now is you need to make sure that down to that fire team level, down to that individual saying “you and you shoot that building, or hey, F-18, F-35, F-16 take out that building”.

 

An MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter takes off from the amphibious assault ship USS Peleliu with a pallet of ammunition. Peleliu is underway off the coast of Southern California conducting an ammunition offload and transfer with the amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island.

Credit: USN Visual Service, March 16, 2011

SLD:   Where should the D on that be, Colonel?

Colonel Osborn: I’m a much bigger fan of pushing decisions down as far as you can.  You provide the guidance, you provide the mission, you provide the parameters, and you provide the support from higher command levels. But let the guy on the ground execute.

SLD:   Right.  And that’s why from my point of view, the F-35B fits the Marine Corps perfectly…

Colonel Osborn: Well, they’re living it in the F-22 right now.  The F-22 is kicking butt as a Fifth generation fighter when it comes to capability.  The F-35B will give the amphibious forces that Fifth generation capability to include stealth and a host of other capabilities.  Command and control across the battlespace becomes even more sophisticated and at times challenging.

SLD: How then would you use the AWACS?

Colonel Osborn: Here’s what I like about AWACS type capability from the view of our recent deployment, having lived this in Pakistan… So many of the places that we operate in the world do not have a radar capable ATC system.  Pakistan has a very good one, down to about 2,000 feet AGL.  So anything below 2,000 feet is flying without radar support.  That’s what an AWACS type system can do especially in a Joint/Combined operation.  If the AWACS did nothing more than tell you Dragon 01, you got a flight of six, at your one o’clock at 5 miles.  It’s a safety of flight thing. But it’s a very expensive safety of flight.  It is a different picture and challenge when operating with stealth and UAV aircraft at higher altitudes.

SLD: So you took a typical MEU with old equipment.

Colonel Osborn: Right now, it’s the current pattern for the west coast MEUs, and it’s what we called an old school MEU.  Plus we fit aboard those three amphibs, and strangely enough, that’s the smallest square footage of embark space you can get with any three amphibs.  When you take the LHA with the model of LPD and LSD that we had.  We had the smallest embarkable footprint. So we left a lot of equipment at home. We had to prioritize the multi-mission capable assets. If it wasn’t multi-mission, I didn’t take it.  So, I left things like the armored seven-ton, the Armadillo.  I left those at home; because it has one mission.  It’s an armored bus.  I didn’t want an armored bus, I needed a truck.  So you follow that mentality. We also trained as an aggregate force during our normal workup.  We trained as a three-ship operating together within relative distance of each other, line of sight most of the time.  We trained where our deepest operations were about 140 miles, 150 miles deep.  That was our training package.  That’s a standard MEU workup-training package. We were tasked to be the Proof of Concept for the re-introduction of the visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) mission.  So we coined a new phrase, the Maritime Raid Force.  And we shaped a Maritime Raid Force Capability.

We were tasked to be the Proof of Concept for the re-introduction of the visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) mission.  So we coined a new phrase, the Maritime Raid Force.  And we shaped a Maritime Raid Force Capability.

 

The Navy does VBSS, level 1 and level 2 they call it, which is unopposed, basically, they’re Coast Guard type actions.  They pull up alongside a ship that they want to talk to.  Ask them hey, can we come aboard?  They say yes, you can board, you snoop around, and you collect information. But the Navy does this with all of their smaller ships, they do it with all of their destroyers, they also do it with all of the small deck amphibs. The mission that we picked up is between that level and the true special operations mission. It’s an integrated Navy/Marine Corps package, the assault boats that we use to go take the ships down are Naval Special Warfare boats.  They are SEAL RHIBs.And the Navy runs those.  The shadowing ship, the ship that we launch from is a Navy ship.  We also put a Marine sniper team on the bridge wing of that ship.  And he provides fixed fire coverage.  We also put aircraft on that ship; I put Hueys and Cobras on that ship.  They provided my heavy firepower with the Cobra.  Command and control, ISR and also some offset firepower with a sniper was provided by the Huey.

So, you take a target ship, which is what we did with the MV Magellan Star, the ship that we recovered from the pirates. When we pulled in, the USS PRINCETON was on the station, and was watching the ship.  The USS DUBUQUE got into position, which was our Maritime Raid Force launch platform that we had set up.  We had four assault RHIBs on the USS DUBUQUE. I had a team from the MEU command element embedded with these guys.  And we had ships personnel that were trained in all the follow on actions.  The question is always what will you do when you capture the ship and all that? So that’s the ship control team.


A sailor aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS Tortuga guides a Japan Ground Self-Defense Force truck carrying humanitarian supplies into the well deck of the ship. Tortuga is transporting the equipment to support Operation Tomodachi, a humanitarian assistance mission in the aftermath of a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami.

Credit: USN Visual Service, March 16, 2011

 

SLD: What impact would the new capabilities have had if they were deployed with the MEU?

Colonel Osborn: Modern piracy is more about holding the ship hostage for ransom, whereas in days of old, it was to ransack the ship, take whatever you could off that you could do for booty, and cut the throats of the people onboard, throw them over the side and keep going.  That’s not the way they do it now.  Nowadays, it is a pure business. Piracy in Malaysia, back in the 90’s, was more capturing boats and then turning them into illegal trafficking platforms.  They’d capture large yachts; they would capture small freighters and all that.  The stuff that’s going on now off the coast of Somalia — and to some extent off the coast of Nigeria with oil platforms as well, and there’s a couple other places around the world where it happens. They’re capturing ships, because they know that the insurance money that the ship has on it is huge. When we were over there, there were about 14 ships that were being held by Somalia pirates, with about 150 people.  So this is a growth industry; a very lucrative growth industry. And the trick is that the pirates are getting more aggressive and they’re getting more dangerous.  So what the Navy and the Marine Corps really came up with was a potential operational solution.  We needed the ability to do an opposed boarding.

We look at this as two stages of opposition to the boarding.  You have active opposition and passive opposition.  Passive is the guys are just not letting you get onboard but they’re not really doing anything to stop you.The active opposition can take the form of truly offensive, or it can just be denial.  And the truly offensive is what we train to.  The guy’s standing there with a weapon, and he’s just got the weapon in his hand, that’s an opposed boarding.  If he raises the weapon to his shoulder, that’s offensive and he dies, instantly.  And that’s the way our ROE was written.

ROE became our guidance when you pull the trigger on a guy. Finding that target ties directly to future capabilities.  The F-35B and other platforms with a robust ISR/C2 capability could be used to cue the assault force well before reaching the target.  We tried this with our Harriers and the Navy MH-60s.  It worked very well in training.  But at the time of the MV Magellan Star takedown, those assets were a thousand miles away conducting other missions.  We used the Hueys and Cobras to provide that lethal C2 and ISR coverage, but not as integrated with the Assault Force as we would have liked it to be. The counter piracy mission is very law enforcement oriented, and the rules of evidence fully apply.  We actually have a law enforcement guy that would go aboard the ships as well.  So you actually follow all the rules of evidence, you actually collect fingerprints and other materials. This is the world we operate in.The Maritime Raid Force that we trained up for this had that same tasking as if that was not a ship, but was a shore facility.  It could be a take down on an oil refinery that’s on the coastline. We could do it.  That’s what the Maritime Raid Force was built around.

The F-35B and other platforms with a robust ISR/C2 capability could be used to cue the assault force well before reaching the target.  We tried this with our Harriers and the Navy MH-60s.  It worked very well in training.  But at the time of the MV Magellan Star takedown, those assets were a thousand miles away conducting other missions.  We used the Hueys and Cobras to provide that lethal C2 and ISR coverage, but not as integrated with the Assault Force as we would have liked it to be. The counter piracy mission is very law enforcement oriented, and the rules of evidence fully apply.

SLD: And this is also a useful tool for embassy rescue and embassy support and that sort of thing?

Colonel Osborn: Absolutely. The way you look embassy reinforcement is it’s a raid.  It has limited objectives and limited duration.

SLD:   So, you took one of your three ships, which was the mother ship for offloading the raiding force.

Colonel Osborn: It was also  a fire support platform- the ship that they were taking out was dead in the water – the USS DUBUQUE was parked about 300 meters away and had a Marine sniper team on the bridge wing, looking at the target ship. And you also had all the gun mounts on the USS DUBUQUE manned as well, with marines and sailors.  So you have 50 cal and 25 millimeter guns.  Plus the fact that you’ve got a Cobra loaded to the teeth that’s sitting there right off the shoulder pointing at you.  And you’ve got a Huey overhead, and you can see a Marine hanging out overhead with the sniper rifle.

SLD:   Well, let’s look at just this mission for a moment, and fast-forward, you have Bs and Ospreys.  How would they contribute in this particular mission?

Colonel Osborn: I wanted to use the sensors on my Harriers, my Hueys, and my Cobras.  I could not do it, because we haven’t bought the capability.  The Harrier and the Huey have a tremendous sensor on them.  But I can’t get that imagery live that the pilot is seeing on his display to the shooter in the assault boat.And I want the guy in the boat to be able to tell the shooter up high, the Harrier, hey, I got it.  I can see the guy behind the bridge wing right there.  And I’m telling you, we’re looking at the target through the same binoculars, and that’s not an RPG.  That’s an SA14.  Okay change in mission and change in risk. Now our threat factor’s gone up.  And so, what you do is you tie the shooter on the ground — sensor on the ground — to the sensor shooter in the air.  And your ROE switches over from “is this a viable target to take out with a surface force?  Or do I need to do some prep fires or do I need some precision fire?”

We haven’t bought the amphibious and aviation communications needed to do this.  That’s the biggest limitation we’ve got right now.  Overall amphibious comms is one of the biggest limiting factors.  Compared with what I have aboard the big deck, if I go ashore with my command element, I have more connectivity and capability with my command element ashore.  I actually have more with my organic ground based assets, than all three ships added together. And we’re not taking this aircraft and back channeling it back into the amphibs.  This aircraft (F-35B) is going to bring a huge capability for C4ISR delivered to the raiding party.  It’s going to sit inside the cockpit, rather than work it from the (Amphib) ship.

SLD:   This is potentially a breakthrough platform for the Navy/Marine Corps for the 21st century. I want to go back to your Harrier point.  And one of the things I’m struck with is that you take this 360-degree operational aircraft with flying situational awareness. The tip of spear guy is using a 360-degree telescope.  And the jamming capability of the F-35B is important as well.

Colonel Osborn: You want to shut them down, but you don’t want to shut them down the whole Middle East, you want to shut down that one ship. I need a platform out there that not only can see, and not only can talk, but that whenever the guy on the assault boat says okay, we’re about to unmask behind the mother ship that could take these guys down, turn off their stuff via electronic jamming.

SLD:   Can you talk about the ability to inject force and the options this gives the National Command Authority.

Colonel Osborn: The seabased raiding party concept can allow significant flexibility.  You can go where the enemy is not. You’ve got the raid; escalate the mission into something where it’s some kind of power projection or something like that. As you elevate the presence of a Marine into a combat zone, as you say, the scope of operation just goes wide and deep.

SLD: Right.  And parked where the enemy can’t get at you for the first round.  In other words, everybody’s arguing the Marine Corps is irrelevant, because they haven’t had opposed landings.  My argument is they have been too smart to have opposed landings and go where they’re not opposed so they can prevail.

Colonel Osborn: And I lived the greatest example of that all around.  Desert Storm.  I was part of the amphibious taskforce that was sitting off the coast of Kuwait that was causing Saddam to put a layered defense all up and down the Kuwaiti coast.  The LZ that we were going to land in on D-Day in Kuwait was high risk.  For the LZ, our projected losses were going to be a quarter of the helicopters across the beach would not come back out.

That was the projected loss rate.  I mean, we had all the mine countermeasure stuff, we looked at everything we could do to get in, and try to insert forces in the backside, the breakout and all that.  Thankfully, it was a ruse, and it was a very successfully played on, because what we really did was we loaded up the Marines on the beach down in Saudi Arabia, and then we punched him in the nose and ran over him from a completely different direction.That is a great example of what we will probably do in any future conflict.  It is stupid to go against the bad guy’s strength.  That’s why in a huge debate that goes on between the Navy and the rest of the world about going against the Chinese, it’s always about strength versus strength.  You never go against strength.  You find the weakness.  Every situation has a weak point.  And you insert the flexible force, which is the ARG.

SLD: In effect the ARG can become the hub of operations across the spectrum of warfare and capabilities in support of both hard and soft power.  In fact, the modern MEU can perhaps even redefine the vortex between soft and hard power.

Colonel Osborn: The MEU is based on a mobile sea-base.  As such, the seabase can provide the hospitals, the command control, the R&R place, etc.  It’s a city with an airport on top of it and more.But the real key for me is that we can go from high-end time sensitive targeting type stuff, which is one of our core missions to missions like flood relief – all on the same day.  It is the flexibility of the ARG to support the national command authority, which is central to understanding why modernizing the ARG is so important to the nation.

 

F35B in Flight

Credit: Lockheed Martin

 

SLD: Let us speak the modernization piece.

Colonel Osborn: When we were parked off of Pakistan, I was launching the Harriers 450 nautical miles inland into Afghanistan, providing CAS  (close air support) over Afghanistan and then bring them back out.  They were plugged in fully and they’d execute operations and then come out.This is from an amphib.  We did 525 flight hours in just under 60 days on 6 jets.  The first use of the GBU-54 by Naval air was the Harriers from the big deck amphib.  Could I have done more with an F-35B?  Oh absolutely.  Not only could I have carried more ordinance, I could’ve got there faster and with less risk. F-35B would’ve kicked in the door. We would be able to plug in completely to the other services and provide the warfighter with the best support available. Asset allocation is also a big discussion, but for the rifleman on point – who cares whether it’s owned by the Air Force, the Army or the Navy. We don’t care. Higher headquarters has  to facilitate operations in that battle space.  And they cannot be an impediment to operations.

And that’s one of the reasons why in our mind, the F-35, the V-22 and some of these others, expand our battle space dramatically. But what it also does is, is it now forces the other services, both in the Air Force and in the Navy and in the Army, and also forces international partners to realize that the battle space is no longer what you can see from the ship.  It is no longer that 100 miles out, it’s no longer that 200 miles out.  It’s truly as far as you want to fly. Six hundred and fifty miles inland and it’s supportable.  Logistics and sustainment –  doing it old school – which was we’d fly stuff via helo from ship to shore.  Put it on a KC-130J and fly up to Northern Pakistan to conduct operations. That’s how we did sustainment and its very hard to do.  If I had V-22s, I would have been flying straight to the operations area from the ship.I f I would’ve had the F-35B, instead of having to take the ship off station and push it 90 miles offshore so they could get into the box where they’d launch at the boulevard for the Harriers, I could’ve launched them right off the coast of Pakistan, where we were off of Karachi.  Because of the range, speed and performance of the F-35B. The emerging capabilities of the MV-22 and the future capabilities of the F-35B reduce the commander’s risk and you make his mission simpler by expanding his capabilities from the platform’s he’s got.  And that’s the win-win moneymaker.

That’s one of the reasons why in our mind, the F-35, the V-22 and some of these others, expand our battle space dramatically. But what it also does is, is it now forces the other services, both in the Air Force and in the Navy and in the Army, and also forces international partners to realize that the battle space is no longer what you can see from the ship.  It is no longer that 100 miles out, it’s no longer that 200 miles out.  It’s truly as far as you want to fly. Six hundred and fifty miles inland and it’s supportable.  Logistics and sustainment –  doing it old school – which was we’d fly stuff via helo from ship to shore.  Put it on a KC-130J and fly up to Northern Pakistan to conduct operations. That’s how we did sustainment and its very hard to do.  If I had V-22s, I would have been flying straight to the operations area from the ship.I f I would’ve had the F-35B, instead of having to take the ship off station and push it 90 miles offshore so they could get into the box where they’d launch at the boulevard for the Harriers, I could’ve launched them right off the coast of Pakistan, where we were off of Karachi.  Because of the range, speed and performance of the F-35B. The emerging capabilities of the MV-22 and the future capabilities of the F-35B reduce the commander’s risk and you make his mission simpler by expanding his capabilities from the platform’s he’s got.  And that’s the win-win moneymaker.

"If everyone is thinking alike, someone isn’t thinking."

—General George Patton Jr.

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