The Role of Expeditionary Logistics in Shaping New Combat Capabilities
2014-01-13 By Murielle Delaporte
Case: 2 The Role of Expeditionary Logistics in Shaping New Combat Capabilities
The revolution in logistics seen in air and maritime support for ground forces can reshape how these forces operate.
The French experience in Mali provides a case in point.
The French forces were requested by the Mali government to intervene to defend the capital almost at the last moment. Because the French have built a very integrated, and rapid deployment force – one forged around expeditionary logistics – the French were able to intervene rapidly, and to move rapidly.
What this let the French forces do was to attack the aggregated enemy forces. What is often forgotten is that extremist forces may well disperse to avoid destruction but to have a real political effect from the use of their forces, one needs to aggregate the forces and seize territory. One only has to remember the teachings of Mao to understand this point.
What this means as well is that an outside force configured and poised to attack aggregated enemy forces moving against definable territorial “prizes” can be attacked as such.
French forces entered rapidly at the beginning of the operation, and, as a result, they have been forming a 21st century caravan approach where logistics and operational elements had to be combined into a single force. There is no classic approach to the rear and the front. The forces are expeditionary and carry their capabilities with them, and are adjusting their capabilities as they transition to the next phases of the operation.
In what could be called phase one of the operation, the French did their own version of “shock and awe.”
A rapid and massive offensive was generated to block the insurgents from reaching Bamako who were within reach of the capital within a matter of days. The French government on January 11th, 2013 after a request for help came from the President of Mali mobilized an insertion force.
A month later, as the Commander of the French Army Aviation in Mali explained, “the enemy has been taken by surprise and is now destabilized. Because of the lightning speed of the maneuver by the Serval (the name given by the French to the operation) force, the insurgents are now fleeing and not willing to fight as they did not expect such concentration and mobility above their heads.”
This effort has been possible due to several factors:
The first factor is the speed of the French forces and their ability to act from the outset in a matter of hours as far as air operations were concerned. For example, on the Air Force side, the very first strikes made by the Rafale fighters taking off from the FAB Saint Dizier were done thanks to a nine hours and thirty-five minutes flight involving five air-to-air refueling.
On the Army side, it took only two days for the French Army Air Mobility Group (GAM for «Groupe aéromobile») to be operational and in autonomous operation after a strategic airlift from the South of France to the capital of Mali involving close to 300 men and 20 helos. As a French officer involved in the operation has noted: “after leaving Bamako for Sevare five hundred kilometers further on January 26th, then leaving again for Gao on February 6th five hundred kilometers further, I have available the support tools of nearly a full regiment ranging from my air control tower (…) to spares allowing me to last for months.”
The rapid surge of the Serval force, which eventually grew to three battalion-sized Task Forces (GTIA for « Groupement tactique interarmes »), has also been facilitated by France’s historic presence and defense commitments in this part of the world (e.g. the Epervier operation in Chad since 1986 and the UN Unicorn operation in Ivory Coast since 2002). And France was able to leverage various national assets currently based in other African countries.
Mobility and concentration of forces have also been rendered possible by good C2 and joint training and experience between the French Air Force (Rafale and Mirage 2000D fighters and N’Djamena-based JFACC), the Navy (with the amphibious assault ship BPC Dixmude bringing ground elements ashore and with the Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft crucial to coordinate CAS operations between Army aviation and ground troops) and the Army.
While executing phase one, the French were preparing their transition to the next phase, a phase in which regional peacekeepers and the Mali Army itself would become the key force to provide for stability. The French themselves are keeping a modest force in place, one that can aid in the process but can also move rapidly within the country to defend themselves plus their allies.
From the beginning, the French intervention was not seen as an isolated event, but as one designed to clear the path for coalition forces to take over the mission. For France, the North African region, in many ways, is as significant as is Mexico for the United States. And in a region of close proximity with high strategic consequences, ongoing engagement is a reality.
Regional support is absolutely key to prolong the deterrent effect of the French initial military action and has been made possible by the months of preparation, which took place before it occurred ahead of schedule, as is the one of the international community via the United Nations and/or other organizations. The latter is slowly, but surely picking up with a growing number of allied countries’ logistic and support assets being gathered to help French and African armed forces’ sustainability on a theater where vast elongations and the ability to hold a difficult territory are the key challenges.
Transport aircraft and tankers have been sent early on by the United States and European countries, while the Eindhoven-based European Air Transport Command is increasing its involvement (the participation of a Dutch KDC10 and soon of a German A310 MRTT tanker is one of the most recent developments).
From a French prospective, the goal is to start reversing the balance between supported and supporting forces as early as the end of March in order to prevent the “Afghanisation” of the conflict feared by many, but in a secure, responsible and coordinated manner.
Phase three could be characterized as the shaping of the post-insurgent Mali, and here working with the Mali government and African forces is central. In this phase, European support and trainers will be a key part of shaping whatever is possible with regard to stability in Mali. European military training, which is also kicking in, will also be a key factor to make sure African ground troops have the best chances to secure the whole land of Mali.
In other words, the French experience in Mali is about building an insertion force on top of expeditionary logistics able to work within the region and to become a lead element in its own transition and withdrawal. The French approach is very much about how to intervene and to trigger coalition operations in order to stabilize the situation with regional partners, rather than to simply stay in place for a long time.
It is “shock and awe” to deter the enemy and to trigger space for coalition success, not “shock and awe” for the sake of staying.
We are publishing in five parts a full draft of the article which appeared recently in Joint Force Quarterly.