
The Soviets, Germany,
and the New Europe

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by

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To my brother and sister
Harriet and Bruce Laird,
who have had a much better
relationship than the
Soviets and the Germans

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Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	ix
Overview	1
1 The Soviets and the West in Historical Perspective: The Emergent European Security Challenge	22
2 The Soviets and the Western Alliance: The Classical Approach	39
3 The Soviets and West European Security Cooperation, 1985-1989	56
4 Soviet Assessments of West Germany, 1985-1987	98
5 Soviet Assessments of West Germany, 1987-1989	120
6 Soviet Public Diplomacy Toward West Germany, 1985-1989	146
7 Soviet Assessments of the German Unification Process, 1989-1990	163
8 The Soviets and the New Federal Republic of Germany: Dealing with the New Europe	197
<i>Index</i>	209

even said they could accept a West European role in Eastern Europe), they clearly denied the legitimacy of West European military integration. The common European home would be possible only if there were no military integration of Western Europe, according to the Soviets.

Unquestionably the state visit of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was the most important event in Soviet-German relations during the 1988-1989 period. What mattered most was not the treaties and agreements that were signed during the visit; rather it was the way Gorbachev presented himself to the West Germans and their response to that image.

The Gorbachev visit to Bonn was an important milestone in the Soviet approach to West Germany. Above all, the visit symbolized the desire of the Soviet leadership to end the cold war and to strengthen ties with Western Europe.

The visit represented the culmination of a number of public diplomacy efforts from 1985 through the middle of 1989. Above all, the Soviet leaders promoted the idea that there was a "new" look in Soviet policy. Soviet officials were more realistic and willing to accept the "realities" of modern society as they understood it. The Soviets claimed to accept the legitimacy of a number of Western institutions which used to be anathema to them, such as NATO and the EEC.

While the Soviets might not like any of these institutions, they do exist, and they finally recognized that these institutions had to be dealt with. For example, with respect to NATO, high-ranking Soviet officials, including Gorbachev himself, frequently stated in this period that they were not trying to drive wedges in the Alliance and that they accepted the legitimacy of some form of American presence in Europe.

Furthermore, the Soviets emphasized to West Germans that the nature of Soviet society was changing. The image became one of a society which had been stultified by the old but which had been unleashed by new thinking. Over the past thirty years the West German elite had perceived the vitality of Soviet society to be in steady decline. The Soviets were explicitly trying to reverse this trend by using the "new thinking" and glasnost campaigns to highlight innovation in Soviet society.

Above all, Soviet spokesmen underscored that there was a growing and more realistic possibility of East-West reconciliation if Soviet initiatives were met with correspondingly serious proposals by the West. Simply put, the message was as follows: "We are now reasonable; work

with us and we can put the old confrontations behind us and live in a more peaceful and interdependent world."

In short, Soviet public diplomacy was significantly aided by the new dynamism of Soviet domestic and foreign policy, as well as by the new realism in Soviet assessments of developments in the West. The Soviet Union also promoted its image as a society in crisis, which therefore could no longer pose a serious threat to West Germany.

The Soviets and the Unification Process, 1989-1990

The book concludes with an identification of the Soviet assessment of the German unification process and proper Soviet policy toward it. Chapter seven addresses how Soviet analysts debated the issue in the year of unification. The parameters of the debate are identified at the outset and then detailed treatments for each month are provided through December 1990. The debate was so fluid and dynamic that a monthly coverage is necessary to follow the terms of the debate.

In the final chapter--chapter eight--the general cleavages of opinion within the Soviet elite over the German unification issue are identified. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the emerging Soviet debate about the new Federal Republic and how to deal with the new Europe.

The Fall of the GDR

Earlier Soviet public diplomacy under Gorbachev concentrated on how West Germany would react to change in the Soviet Union, but in late 1989 and 1990 the diplomatic focus shifted instead to how the Soviet leadership would deal with change in Germany--especially the future of East Germany. When Gorbachev attended the celebration in East Berlin in October 1989, it was clear that while he advocated certain reforms for the GDR, he still envisaged a socialist East German state. But to East German citizens Gorbachev symbolized a broad hope for reforms; they greeted him with chants of "Gorby, Gorby" when he joined Erich Honecker to attend the public ceremonies. After Egon Krenz had replaced Honecker, Gorbachev reportedly told him that he had felt uncomfortable at Honecker's side during the ceremonies once he perceived how the public mood had shifted. Gorbachev is said to have told Krenz that in recent years Honecker had failed to realize what was really going on in the GDR. Gorbachev also reportedly expressed regret that Honecker

had not enacted necessary reforms two or three years earlier, and that he had seemed unwilling to listen to Gorbachev's arguments for reform.

Despite these calls for reform, however, it is clear that initially the Soviet leadership never questioned the continued existence of two German states. Soviet officials even warned that discussion of reunification of the two German states could have disastrous consequences for European stability. After meeting with other European leaders Gorbachev reportedly concluded that the post-war balance of power in Europe had to be maintained; a position he believed was shared by American elites.

This early rejection of any discussion of reunification became clear when the Soviet Union rejected the 10-point plan presented to the Bundestag by Helmut Kohl on November 28, 1989. This step-by-step plan called first for a German confederacy and eventually reunification. While Kohl did not mention a time frame, he later said that 10 or more years would be likely. However, the Soviets rejected the Kohl initiative, with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze terming it a "direct diktat" from Bonn. During a meeting with his counterpart, Hans Dietrich Genscher in December, Shevardnadze said the confederacy idea would lead to "confusion." Gorbachev also reportedly warned Genscher against aggressively taking advantage of the difficulties caused by perestroika. Instead, he advised West Germany to support reform within the Warsaw Pact countries. He also expressed concern that if change in the GDR got out of hand it could threaten the security of the Soviet forces stationed in the GDR.

During a December 19 speech to the Political Committee of the European Parliament in Brussels, Shevardnadze absolutely rejected calls for a speedy German reunification. He made clear that peaceful cooperation between the GDR and FRG should be based on the acceptance of equality and sovereignty of the two German states. Future developments would have to be left to the course of history, within the framework of an all-European process.

For Shevardnadze, there was no guarantee that German unity would not threaten other nations and the stability of Europe as a whole. He was especially concerned about possible territorial claims that might be pursued by a united Germany. He also stressed that Soviet citizens had the right to know how changes in central Europe could affect their future security. Shevardnadze made a point of reminding his audience that the Soviet Union had paid with 20 million lives for Europe's current stability. He conceded that once Europe had passed beyond its period of confron-

tation, then there would be opportunities to overcome the division of the continent, based on the values of all Europeans.

Shevardnadze took a similar line in an article published in the January 19, 1990 issue of *Izvestiya*. He wrote that the German question was an integral part of the overall question of European unity. While the relationship between the GDR and FRG could be an important factor in the process of European integration and consolidation, if that relationship moved too far or contradicted the existing international order then disastrous consequences could result. There could be no doubt that an artificial acceleration of the "inter-German" process would lead to its separation from the realities in Europe, with disastrous consequences for all. More specifically, Shevardnadze rejected calls from West Germans that a united Germany could remain in NATO.

In an interview with the West German Communist Party newspaper *Unsere Zeit* on February 2, 1990, the Soviet Ambassador to the FRG, Yury Kvitsinsky made clear that both German states were part of the existing European structure of states, and that the all-European process could only develop undisturbed on that basis. Kvitsinsky described the GDR as an ally that the Soviet Union should not abandon. He expressed Soviet concern over West German influence on the issue of free elections in the GDR. Kvitsinsky acknowledged the right of self-determination for all peoples in Europe, but added that no principle of international law could be viewed in isolation.

Accepting the Inevitable

During the first months of 1990, it became increasingly obvious that East German citizens desired unification with West Germany. While nationalism certainly was a major factor, the principal motivation was unquestionably the GDR's economic crisis, which worsened daily. More and more West Germans also began to view reunification as inevitable, and that it would not have to wait a decade or more. This growing perception contrasted sharply with the decade-plus timetable implied in the Kohl plan.

In addition to this rapid change in West German perceptions of what was possible, in early 1990 the Soviet leadership also seemed to have accepted that the German question was on the agenda. Recognizing the pressure for unification because of the GDR's economic chaos, on February 1 East German Prime Minister Hans Modrow presented a plan for

self-determination and confederation that he first discussed with Gorbachev during a visit to Moscow on January 30. Modrow's plan endorsed "free self-determination of the Germans in both states" and a gradual move from confederacy to unification, as joint institutions assumed more and more responsibility. For this confederacy to be transformed ultimately into a federal state, Modrow laid out a key pre-condition: in a step-by-step process, each of the two states would loosen ties to their respective military alliances and move to a neutral status. At his January 30 meeting with Modrow, Gorbachev told journalists in Moscow that in principle no one should question the right of the Germans to unify, as long as all involved acted responsibly. Then, during Kohl's visit to Moscow in February, Gorbachev accepted that the Germans themselves could decide the timing and manner of their unification. Three days later, the USSR, the US, the UK, France, and the two German states agreed to begin the so-called "Two Plus Four" negotiations.

On March 18, 1990, the German Democratic Republic held its first free election, with results surprising almost all observers. The three parties comprising the Allianz fur Deutschland (Alliance for Germany) unexpectedly won a plurality with 48.15 percent of the vote. The coalition's dominant party, the GDR-CDU, alone won 40.91 percent. Prior to the election, it was widely expected that the Alliance would finish second to the SPD, although by the end of the campaign it seemed that the gap had perhaps closed. Still, no one expected--least of all the Soviets--that the SPD would only end up with 21.84 percent. Probably the biggest surprise was that the Party of Democratic Socialism (the revamped communist party) managed only 16.33 percent.

As a result of the election, the CDU's Lothar de Maiziere took office as the GDR's first freely elected prime minister. Ironically, since his party was committed to unification as rapidly as possible it was clear that de Maiziere also intended to be the GDR's last freely elected prime minister. The CDU's success in East Germany undoubtedly eased coordination between the two German states in the subsequent unification process, especially in the Two Plus Four talks.

The election also made clear that at least since mid-1989, the Soviet leadership had backed the wrong horses: first Erich Honecker, then Egon Krenz, new PDS chairman Gregor Gysi, and Hans Modrow. In the last few weeks before the election, as Moscow realized that the PDS would surely lose, the Soviets even made clear their official support for the Social Democratic candidate Ibrahim Bohme, but to no avail. Despite all

these problems in figuring out who could be the right man for the future of the GDR and Germany as a whole, the Kremlin actually proved relatively willing to finally accept the new reality. After Gorbachev reached the conclusion that unification would be inevitable, he focused on the question of alliance ties and economic relations, especially Soviet-GDR trade.

Before moving to those two issues, it should be noted that once Moscow had accepted the inevitability of unification, the Soviets still believed initially that this did not mean that the GDR would simply join the Federal Republic under Article 23 of the West German Grundgesetz. Instead the Soviets apparently expected a new state to be established. Moscow also criticized the speed with which Bonn and East Berlin agreed on economic and monetary union.

From Neutrality to NATO Membership

Moscow's acceptance of one German state still left unsettled the security aspects of unification, particularly concerning borders, alliances, and Four Power rights. The Soviets made clear that the future of peace and security in Europe depended on the resolution of these issues.

After some initial hesitation by the Kohl government, the border question was solved fairly easily by parliamentary decisions endorsing the existing borders and pledging to negotiate a separate treaty with Poland following unification. The political-military status of the unified Germany proved more contentious, especially concerning alliance membership. Initially the Soviets strongly criticized -- and resolutely rejected -- the prospect of a unified Germany as a NATO member. In his February 2 interview with the West German communist newspaper *Unsere Zeit*, Ambassador Kvitsinsky said it would be an illusion to believe the Federal Republic could avoid changing its membership in NATO. Without change, the balance of power and security structure in Europe would be destroyed. On the same day, the Soviet Foreign Ministry's deputy spokesman said during a visit to East Berlin that it would be unrealistic and unacceptable to think that a united Germany could be a member of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Instead the solution would be somewhere in between. He recommended that the two German states leave their alliances, adding that the Soviet Union supported either disintegration of both alliances or their transformation into a more political context.

Valentin Falin, a Gorbachev advisor and a leading German expert, gave an important interview on this subject in the February 19 issue of *Der Spiegel*. Falin completely rejected the view that Soviet security interests might actually be served by Germany remaining within NATO, bluntly terming such an argument as "absurd." He repeated the Soviet argument about preserving the balance of power in Europe. However, he also said that in the past the concept of "neutrality" had been defined too narrowly. The Soviets viewed neutrality as meaning that no new military threat could emanate from German soil, but that Germany could still maintain a military capability to provide a reasonable defense. He added that Germany should not be discriminated against, since that could lead to an explosive situation. Falin also disagreed with a suggestion attributed to Nikolai Portugalov that the Soviets might accept a "French status" for Germany--politically an alliance member but militarily independent. In general, Falin warned that if NATO would not give up its demand for German membership then there would be no unification. He also said that the Soviet Union would still have "latent rights" concerning East Germany, and that even after the March elections, the GDR would have to fulfill all its commitments to the Warsaw Pact.

Ultimately these issues all fell under the auspices of the Two Plus Four negotiations, which were viewed by all sides as an integral link to the broader Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process. As these talks began, the Soviets initially maintained their position that the united Germany should be neutral. Then Shevardnadze, Falin, and other Soviet representatives proposed that Germany could simultaneously remain in both alliances, which Shevardnadze described as a compromise between the Western demand for NATO membership and the Soviet demand for neutrality. After such a transitional phase, Germany would simply become part of an all-European security system that would emerge from the two alliances.

At the May 1990 Two Plus Four conference in Bonn, Moscow revised its earlier stance that unification could not proceed without resolution of all foreign as well as domestic issues. Instead, Shevardnadze said, it would be possible to resolve the domestic and foreign elements separately. In other words, the Soviets recommended that the Germans proceed establishing domestic unification, while certain external questions might have to wait for the future. To the Germans, this clearly meant future restrictions on sovereignty, which was unacceptable to

Bonn, especially the Foreign Ministry. Chancellor Kohl had already made clear that there would be no all-German election without prior agreement on the foreign aspects of unification as well. Still, the Germans were optimistic that the six foreign ministers could complete their work by the CSCE summit scheduled for November 1990. In various statements, the Soviets indicated that they did not intend to delay the unification process, and that the Soviet Union could not afford to continue simply following events after the fact.

The solution to the united Germany's military status came with the July 6 declaration from the NATO summit in London. In late April, Gorbachev had opened a window of opportunity by informing GDR Prime Minister de Maiziere that NATO membership would only be possible if NATO made significant changes in structure and strategy, especially concerning forward defense and flexible response. Thus NATO responded in July by announcing doctrinal shifts intended to emphasize the Alliance's defensive orientation, including a description of nuclear weapons as only a "last resort." NATO also called for a non-aggression pact with the Warsaw Pact and invited the Warsaw Pact nations to send official observers to Brussels. In a surprise development coinciding with the summit, Kohl announced that West Germany would unilaterally agree to a ceiling on its military manpower as an attachment to the CFE-I treaty, providing similar limits were quickly negotiated for other countries under CFE-II. In addition to the London summit, the G-7 summit in Houston later that month also expressed Western willingness to support the Soviet reform process.

The climax of these developments was Helmut Kohl's meetings with Gorbachev July 15-16. At Zheleznovodsk, Gorbachev ended up conceding on virtually all remaining points, giving Kohl a coup that seemed to ensure his victory in the first all-German elections in December. In explaining the Soviet willingness to accept Western demands, Gorbachev emphasized the positive outcome of NATO's London summit. Some observers suggested a more complex logic: that the Soviets were hoping that an improved relationship with Germany might give them a kind of advocate to represent their interests within NATO. The Kohl-Gorbachev agreement included the following points:

1. Unification of Germany was defined as unification of the territory of the FRG, GDR, and Berlin.
2. On the day of unification, Four Power rights would end, with Germany regaining full sovereignty.

3. The united Germany would be free to make any decisions concerning alliance membership and participation. Kohl informed Gorbachev that Germany would be a member of NATO, which Gorbachev accepted.

4. Germany and the Soviet Union would negotiate a treaty for withdrawal of all Soviet troops from German territory by the end of 1994.

5. As long as Soviet forces are still deployed on German territory, no NATO forces will be extended to what was East German territory. However, German territorial units not allocated to NATO could be stationed on this territory immediately after unification.

6. Pending the complete Soviet troop withdrawal, the US, UK, and France may continue to deploy forces in West Berlin.

7. By 1994, the combined manpower of the German armed forces would be reduced to 370,000, as part of the CFE-I agreement.

8. The united Germany would not produce or possess weapons of mass destruction.

The Price of Unification

Despite all the attention devoted to the political-military status of the united Germany, many Germans had assumed from the start that the most important questions to be resolved would actually be economic, particularly trade commitments and financial aid. The Soviets also stressed that they could not afford to lose their traditional trade privileges with the GDR.

During Gorbachev's February 1990 meetings with Kohl and Genscher in Moscow, the Soviets made clear that their acceptance of unification depended on two guarantees: German acceptance of Poland's western border and continued fulfillment of the GDR's current export obligations to the Soviet Union. Kohl and Genscher assured Gorbachev that the united Germany would indeed take over those trade obligations. Then in April and May, it became more obvious that the Soviets hoped to link acceptance of unification to further German provision of financial support for the bankrupt Soviet economy. Genscher described the Soviets as seeking a "gigantic investment for the future." More specifically, in May Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov told West German Minister for Economic Affairs Helmut Haussman that the Federal Republic should pledge to repay all financial losses incurred by the Soviet Union from East Germany's movement from the socialist bloc to the capitalist bloc. The Soviets also wanted to ensure a continuous economic relation-

ship rather than a one-time compensation payment, which they feared would isolate them further from the economic development of the European Community.

Gorbachev also raised this economic argument at the end of his July meeting with Kohl at Zheleznovodsk. He emphasized that the Soviet Union's role in ensuring global security required that its "powerful economy" be integrated smoothly with the world's economic relations. For the Soviet Union to make fundamental changes it would be desirable and necessary to make use of the international division of labor and "certain financial resources." But Gorbachev insisted this would not mean gifts or charity; he proposed negotiated agreements which would be mutually advantageous. More specifically Gorbachev urged a rescheduling of Soviet foreign debt.

Moscow also argued that the Soviet troop withdrawal would represent an economic burden. Providing housing for the withdrawn Soviet troops and their families posed a particularly serious challenge. It would also be difficult to ensure a job for every soldier returning from East Germany. Thus the Soviets sought German support for housing construction and job creation.

Over time it also became clear that the Soviets wanted financial compensation for the troops remaining in East Germany until 1994. Ostensibly the Soviets justified this demand on the grounds that the currency union between the two German states would pose a great hardship on the Soviet troops. As a result, in June 1990 the West German Finance Ministry announced that it would pay the Soviets DM 1.25 billion for the 380,000 Soviet troops in the GDR; this payment apparently only covered the second half of 1990. Both sides made a point of explaining this payment in the context of the currency union's impact, rather than a straight payment by Bonn for the cost of maintaining the Soviet deployment.

In August 1990 the Soviets presented a draft treaty containing the points negotiated during the Kohl-Gorbachev meeting. The draft contained 14 points, including a DM 2.5 billion payment in 1991 for the maintenance and initial withdrawal of the Soviet troops in East Germany. Ostensibly the Soviets would repay half that amount by selling off infrastructure in East Germany, but actually most of the land and housing used by the Soviets had been provided free of charge by the GDR. Bonn would also pay the cost of transporting the troops to the Soviet border. The Soviets also wanted Germany to fund 500,000 square meters

of new housing in the Soviet Union for each year from 1991 to 1994. The draft treaty also scrapped a 3.6 billion ruble Soviet debt for goods imported from East Germany.

Finally, on September 13, Shevardnadze and Genscher signed a 20-year bilateral treaty containing among other items a German pledge to pay the Soviets DM 13 billion through 1994. West German Finance Minister Theo Waigel justified this payment as simply the cost for regaining German sovereignty; Genscher frequently used the phrase "the price of unification."

The Future

In general terms, since the early 1970s Soviet foreign policy toward Western Europe has gone through three phases of development. The first phase continued into the beginning of the Gorbachev administration; it inherited the classic approach refined by the Brezhnev administration. In this approach, the Soviets gambled on winning a bet: to expand their influence within Western Europe while undercutting Western Alliance institutions in exchange for the risk of greater West European influence over Eastern Europe. This bet rested on the ability to contain change in the East while promoting the disintegration of the Western bloc. But for this bet to be won, the Soviet Union would need to contain a dynamic course of development.

By the time the Gorbachev administration came to power, it was clear that the Soviets were losing this bet. Notably, the Soviet model was disintegrating due to domestic pressures which were reinforced by an inability to crack the Western coalition. The Brezhnevites had succeeded in combining two failures: Soviet economic and political decline with encirclement by the foreign enemies of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev acted to try to reverse the negative course of history in the second phase of Soviet policy. He placed his own bet for historical development. No longer did the Soviet leadership try to work simply within the confines of the mediated relationship of Eastern and Western Europe. Europeanization and Westernization were moving too briskly for conservative management of a mediated intra-European relationship. It was necessary to announce a new synthesis of East and West within which "socialism" in the East would be informed by and influence the development of "capitalism" in the West.

The fall of the Berlin Wall made it clear that the Soviet leadership lost this bet as well, at least for the time being. Perhaps over the long haul Westernization and capitalism will fail in Eastern Europe and may never take root in the USSR and the pressures for a new synthesis will return. But the dramatic events of the fall of 1989 meant the end of the viability of the Strasbourg synthesis. Ergo, the need to develop a third phase in their approach, but this new phase would prove difficult.

Throughout 1990, not only did the Gorbachev administration have to deal with the German unification process and the explosion of political change in Eastern Europe, but it had to deal with the explosions of tensions within the USSR as well. Suddenly the Russian leadership was faced with the pressure of Westernization moving East (to the GDR and to Eastern Europe) as well as the pressure to create a new Russian and/or Soviet development model. This book closes with the signing of the Soviet-German treaty of December 1990, but this treaty and the process which led to its conclusion are clearly not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.

realism in Soviet assessments of developments in the West. The Soviet Union also promoted its image as a society in crisis, which therefore could no longer pose a serious threat to West Germany.

Notes

1. See e.g., the commentary in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 June 1989, p. 1.
2. See *Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*, *Ostinformationen*, 16 June 1989, p. 10.
3. See *Bulletin*, no. 61, 15 June 1989, p. 541.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. See *Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*, *Ostinformationen*, 16 June 1989, p. 1.
7. See *Bulletin*, no. 61, p. 547.
8. See *Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*, *Ostinformationen*, 15 June 1989, p. 4.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
10. See *Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*, *Ostinformationen*, 14 June 1989, p. 11-19.
11. *Ibid.*, especially pp. 17-18.
12. See *Bulletin*, no. 61, p. 540.
13. *Ibid.*
14. See *Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*, *Ostinformationen*, 16 June 1989, pp. 7-8.
15. The Associated Press Wire with the title "ZDF: Gorbatschow stellt Mauer und Stacheldraht in Frage" is printed in, *Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*, *Ostinformationen*, 15 June 1989, p. 6 (translated from the German by Armin Leon).
16. See *Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*, *Ostinformationen*, 16 June 1989, p. 7.
17. See *Bulletin*, no. 61, p. 548.

7

Soviet Assessments of the German Unification Process, 1989-1990

This chapter identifies and assesses the dynamic and evolving positions taken by various Soviet analysts and policymakers in the debate about German unification. To achieve the goal of accurately portraying Soviet perspectives on the German unity issue in such a fluid period of modern history, this chapter is organized into two sections. The first section presents the basic positions articulated by senior Soviet foreign policymakers, notably Shevardnadze in the period from the Fall of 1989 until December of 1990. The basic phases and underlying objectives articulated by senior officials are the main emphases in the first section.

In the second section the main themes within the Russian press from November 1989 through December 1990 are outlined. By presenting brief summaries of the major themes on a month-by-month basis, the sense of dynamism in trying to shape and defend a Russian position in this fluid period is underscored.

The monthly summaries developed here have been drawn from the Soviet press translated in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Three major daily newspapers are examined here--*Izvestiya*, *Pravda*, and *Krasnaya zvezda*. It is little surprise that *Krasnaya zvezda* advocated a very conservative approach to the various German issues; more noteworthy was the difference in attitude between *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*. *Pravda* consistently adhered to a much more conservative analysis of what was

developing and what the Soviet Union ought to do; *Izvestiya* displayed greater evidence of "new thinking."

Pro-reform publications, which are covered in FBIS as well, include: *Moscow News* and *Komsomolskaya pravda*; *Sovetskaya Rossiya* was representative of the other end of the spectrum. Thus, since the themes treated each month may cut across the various publications, the way in which they are treated can vary dramatically.

Obviously the issue of Germany's future and German unification came to a head in November 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. For the several months prior to that time, most Soviet analyses of Germany in the daily press looked at the state of bilateral relations (both between the USSR and FRG and between the FRG and GDR). The latter, of course, included the mounting problem of East German emigration.

The structure of the second section of this chapter is to identify one or two key themes for each of the months from November 1989 until December 1990. While not specifically mentioned in these month-by-month summaries, there were, of course, numerous official contacts between the USSR and the FRG and GDR. The press coverage of these contacts was always at least adequate, and frequently received more attention than what would normally be accorded even official visits.

Evolving Soviet Perspectives on German Unification, October 1989-December 1990

The views of senior Soviet decisionmakers operated in four different political universes in the very fluid and dynamic period from October 1989 until December 1990. The four periods saw dynamic shifts from one set of assumptions to another as concepts sought to catch up with reality.

The first period preceded the fall of the Berlin Wall. The challenge was to promote reform within the GDR, to keep two Germanies but to promote reform in the USSR through integration within the new Europe.

The second period encompassed the first quarter of 1990 through the elections in the GDR. The perception was that the elections would slow down the process of change and allow the Soviet leadership to prepare the ground for the emergence of the new Germany. The new European security system had to be built prior to the emergence of a unified Germany.

The third period ran from the post-election situation through the July meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev. Here the Soviet leadership tried

to influence the terms of the emergence of the new Germany as a means for shaping the new European-Soviet bargain. Rather than the new European security system preceding the new Germany, the sequence was reversed. The task was to try to have as much influence as possible in shaping the new European system through the increasingly inevitable bargain to create the new Germany.

The fourth period ran from July through December 1990. In this period the task was to formalize the agreement reached in July. But formalization was considered essential to ensure future stability within Europe and to anchor the Soviet role in the new Europe.

Running throughout these four periods were three basic underlying objectives of the Shevardnadze-Gorbachev leadership. First, the new Germany and the new European security systems were interlinked. The Soviet leadership hoped that the unification process could be slowed down in order to create the new European security system in advance of the formation of the new Germany. In a significant article published in *Izvestiya* in January 19, 1990, Shevardnadze put it this way: the process of intra-German reconciliation is a "...process (which) cannot be separated in some way from the general course of dealings between the East and West of Europe. The more dynamic the process of rapprochement among European states in general and the formation of the structures of cooperation and good-neighborliness between them, the better the preconditions will develop for similar changes in FRG-GDR relations."¹

Second, the Soviet leadership linked change in their German policy with change in the USSR itself. Initially, they hoped to see change in the GDR to be linked with change in the Soviet Union and within the Soviet bloc. They hoped for a more gradual process of change. As Shevardnadze put it, "Our foreign policy is pulling this country into the civilized world acting as a guarantee of the reformation of socialism."²

Third, the Soviet leadership constantly spoke of the need to be vigilant in dealing with the structures for the new Germany. They needed to ensure that Soviet interests were clearly taken into account in the process of change. In part, this was due to the need to fend off domestic critics. The Soviet leadership dyad of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze was heading off attacks from the right against accepting German reunification without prior change in the European situation. The most vocal critical was Y. Ligachev. He argued at a Party meeting in February 1990 that "It would be unbelievably short-sighted and a mistake if we didn't see a Germany with huge economic and military potential looming

on the international horizon. I think it is time to recognize the new danger and to speak about it as loud as possible to our own people and party."³

Preceding the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Reform within the Blocs

The main theme during this period is a simple one: peoples have the right to self-determination but not at the expense of the existing borders and "postwar realities" in Europe. This theme was put most forcefully by Shevardnadze in a speech to the United Nations in September 1989. "Every nation is free to choose the ways and means of its own development—but to do so in a responsible manner. It must not lock itself in the dark rooms of national selfishness or ignore the interests of other peoples and the entire community of nations."⁴ After asserting the legitimacy of self-determination, Shevardnadze was quick to circumscribe the claim of the Germans to this right. "Fascism, which started the war, is the extreme and ugliest form of nationalism and chauvinism. German nazism marched under the standards of revanchism. Now that the forces of revanchism are again becoming active and are seeking to revise and destroy the postwar realities in Europe, it is our duty to warn those who, willingly or unwillingly, encourage those forces."⁵

Gorbachev underscored the broad interpretation which the Soviet leadership now provided to self-determination in a trip to Finland at the end of October. In Helsinki, the Soviet leader recognized the legitimacy of Finnish neutrality. He then went on to indicate that the Soviets would not be troubled if Finland chose to become a member of the European Community. This was the first recognition by a Soviet leader of the possible right of European neutrals to join the EC.

Concomitant with Gorbachev's visit to Finland, Shevardnadze was attending a notable meeting of the Warsaw Pact in which he was de facto authorizing its future dissolution. The only point upon which the member state representatives agreed was the importance of keeping Germany divided. The Soviet foreign minister was visiting Warsaw a month after the Solidarity government had come to power. During the Warsaw Pact meeting he promised, de facto, not to use military force in the future to prevent change in Eastern Europe. Shevardnadze argued that the military aspect of the Warsaw Pact should be deemphasized in favor of a more "political" defense agreement, and that problems of security within the Pact would be resolved "through political measures" in the future.

Speaking on the second day of his visit to newly democratic Poland, Shevardnadze said the change in the Pact's character would have to be gradual, however. "We should not forget about defense," he cautioned.⁶

The culmination of Soviet leadership actions in this period was Gorbachev's visit to Berlin for the fortieth anniversary of the GDR. During his visit Gorbachev made it clear that he did not support the regime of Honecker, but wanted to see reform instead. But he hoped for reform socialism within the Soviet bloc, and not the end of the Soviet sphere of influence. Somehow self-determination, reform and socialism were to work toward the same end—maintenance of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Such was Gorbachev's utopian vision in late 1989.

Notably in the meeting between the East German and Soviet heads of state, there was a clear clash of views. And by letting this difference of positions to become known publicly, Gorbachev was seeking to undercut the East German leader. According to the official East German news agency ADN, during three hours of talks, Honecker told Gorbachev that East Germany will adhere to "the basic values" of socialism. "The hopes of bourgeois politicians and ideologues who are aiming for reforms heading to bourgeois democracy and on to capitalism are built on sand," Honecker was quoted as saying. "The Socialist Unity Party will consistently follow the proven course for the good of the people, in the unity of economic and social policies, continuity and renewal," he said. ADN reported that the meeting took place in an atmosphere of "traditional friendship." A day earlier, Gorbachev had urged Warsaw Pact ally East Germany to work with "all forces in society." Gennady Gerasimov, spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry, said that during their meeting, Gorbachev repeated to Honecker a Russian saying that "he who is late is punished." Asked whether that referred to the East German government's repeated rejection of reforms, Gerasimov said: "No, we were talking about our experiences. But journalists do interpret things."⁷

Preceding the March Elections in the GDR

Late 1989 and early 1990 marked a period of extreme confusion in European diplomacy as leaders in the East and the West tried to sort out their objectives in dealing with the new situation in Eastern Europe, and especially with regard to the GDR. For the Soviets, the underlying approach was to accept the abstract right of the Germans to become

unified but to try to slow down the process of change. By retarding the unification process, the Soviets hoped to build new European security structures within which Germany could then be embedded.

First, the Soviet leadership tried to intimidate the West German leadership from embracing the East too quickly. During Genscher's visit to Moscow in December, Shevardnadze forcefully lectured the West German foreign minister on the importance of not taking advantage of the weaknesses of the East German state to promote West German domination. His private tone was even tougher than his public presentation of policy. But publicly, the Soviet leadership railed against the "revanchist" tone of the Kohl speech on reunification presented at the end of November.

Shevardnadze cautioned that long-term European interest must be taken into account. What some were doing in the FRG with regard to the GDR was "fraught with dangerous consequences." He added that Kohl's ten point program was "bordering on outright diktat."⁸

Second, the Soviet leadership sought allies within Western and Eastern Europe to leverage West German policy. Gorbachev met with French President Mitterrand in order to underscore their joint displeasure with too ambitious and too rapid a process of incorporation of the GDR within the FRG. Soviet leaders also met with the Polish leadership to underscore their concern with the West Germans upsetting the post-war boundaries and political arrangements made at the end of World War II.

Third, Shevardnadze paid a historic visit in December to the European Community and to NATO. During this visit, he outlined his vision for change in the structures of Europe. There needed to be an historic shift away from the blocs toward an all-European system. Confrontation was a thing of the past; now the challenge was to build the system for tomorrow.

The Foreign Minister was attending the EC to sign a ten year agreement between the Soviet Union and the EC. He used the occasion to note the opportunities for change in Europe. Shevardnadze declared that the agreement constituted another step in the political and economic changes sweeping across Eastern Europe "at this historic moment when the Cold War is over. This is a result of a gigantic effort made by the peoples of Europe to overcome political and military confrontation, to overcome the economic division of our continent," he said.⁹

Throughout this period, the foreign minister underscored the need to build the new European structures prior to German unification. But unlike the conservative critics of the Gorbachev administration, Shevardnadze was already laying out by the end of December conditions for accepting German unification. Among the concrete questions he posed were the following:

Where are the guarantees that a united Germany will not, in the long term, threaten peace and security in Europe?

Will a united Germany be willing to accept borders and reject any territorial claims?

What place will a united Germany have in Europe's military-political alliances?

What will be a united Germany's military role and its economic role?

What will be the attitude of a united Germany toward allied troops on its soil?

How will a united Germany be connected with the Helsinki process?

Will a united Germany take the interests of the other European states into account?¹⁰

Fourth, the Soviet leadership sought to use the new leadership of the GDR as a lobbying group to protect Soviet interests. They expected an SPD victory in March and hoped to work with the West and East German SPD to shape a new Germany. At the heart of Soviet demands was that the new Germany would be part of a new European security system and would not be part of the Western bloc. Most often the Soviets spoke of the new Germany as being neutral or following a French model with respect to the Western Alliance. But, above all, the insistence was that a new Germany could not be a motor force for further Western development.

In January 1991, then GDR leader Modrow proposed a step-by-step process of unification. The Soviets underscored the significance for them of such a process. Shevardnadze underscored that this proposal showed that "the GDR understands that the problem of German unity does not affect the Germans alone." He added that "It is not the actual idea of German unity that encounters suspicion...but the revival associated with this idea of the sinister phantoms of the past and notions of the possibility of a growth of militarism." He argued that the German

unification process must be synchronized with the all-European process, it must be gradual, existing borders must be preserved, both states must be militarily neutral and the military potential of both states must be dramatically reduced.¹¹

The step-by-step process was also important to Gorbachev and his willingness to accept German unification. As Michael Dobbs noted concerning the Modrow-Gorbachev meeting on 30 January 1990:

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev appeared today to soften the Kremlin's long-standing opposition to German reunification in talks with East German Prime Minister Hans Modrow, while emphasizing that the issue should be solved jointly by East and West. At a news conference here following a day of talks with Soviet leaders, Modrow spoke of a "stage-by-stage" union of East and West Germany, describing reunification as a real possibility. He said he had discussed the idea with Gorbachev and the Soviet leader had not ruled it out.

Earlier, before the start of the talks in the Kremlin, East German reporters pressed Gorbachev for his attitude toward reunification, which had become a dominant political issue in East Germany, where the Communist Party today dropped its opposition to it. The official Soviet news agency *Tass* quoted Gorbachev as saying that the question "was not unexpected," and adding: "No one casts any doubt upon it. Time itself is having an impact on the process and lends dynamism to it. It is essential to act responsibly and not seek the solution to this important issue on the streets."¹²

During a visit to the Soviet Union by Oskar Lafontaine (the SPD candidate for Chancellor) in February, Gorbachev conveyed his expectation that the SPD would win the election in March in the GDR. He expressed strong support for the SPD's position in favor of creating a new European security structure within which to embed the new Germany. Both leaders rejected the notion that the new Germany should be a member of NATO.

In early March when Modrow visited Gorbachev prior to the GDR elections, the Soviet leader made his feelings clear about the future security role for Germany. "We cannot give our agreement to this (NATO

membership). It is absolutely excluded," Gorbachev said in a television interview after talks with East German Prime Minister Hans Modrow.¹³

From March to July 1990

The unexpected victory of the CDU in the March GDR elections quickly transformed the agenda. Events were pressing for German reunification under the aegis of the Federal Republic. The Soviet leadership now accepted unification, but sought to use the process to shape their new relationship with Europe. That is, whereas before the Soviet leaders hoped to see new European security structures constructed prior to unification, they now sought to shape new structures through the bargains forging a unified Germany. They hoped to do this in part through the two-plus-four talks, in part with dealings with the Americans, and in part in dealings directly with the West German leaders.

In this period, the Soviet leadership tried out a wide variety of proposals as components of the bargain to shape the new Germany. They continued the "crazy Eddie" tradition of Gorbachev in which they were willing to propose almost anything that the other side would accept.

First, the Soviets proposed a wide variety of structures within which German security could be solved. Among these are the following: membership in the Warsaw Pact, dual membership in the two alliances, a French model of participation in NATO, neutrality, demilitarization, a dramatic reduction of armed forces in each state and then merging them into a new model army of defensive defense, a model which could be adopted by others.

Second, an insistence that whatever the structural arrangements, the GDR should be treated as a special territorial reserve within Europe. If part of NATO, it could not become territory on which NATO forces could operate.

Third, any changes in German security policy should be linked with other East-West negotiations which were going on, notably the conventional arms control process. It was indispensable that overall Western force reductions must be correlated with West German reductions.

Fourth, West Germany must adhere to agreements made in the past about non possession of weapons of mass destruction. Most significantly, any new German state must adhere strictly to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Fifth, the new Germany must honor the former economic obligations of the GDR. In other words, any contracts signed by the GDR in the past must remain valid for a new German state.

In addition to specific demands, expectations were shaped on the Soviet side in the process of dealing with German unification which became part of the package of accepting unification. Above all, Soviet leaders expressed their expectation that Germany would protect Soviet interests within the European construction process.

On the issue of German membership in NATO, the Soviet leaders rejected this right up to the Gorbachev meeting with Kohl in July 1990. But prior to that meeting a shift was notable in the Soviet treatment of the NATO membership issue. The Soviet leaders insisted that if the new Germany became a member of NATO, this organization must be reformed. NATO reform and German unification were treated as inextricably intertwined from the Soviet point of view.

In May, Shevardnadze clearly laid out the Soviet leadership point of view. Above all, there was a need to internationalize the all-European development process and to create totally new structures on an all-European basis. "It would be naive to suppose that in the new circumstances, the old political and organization instruments will suffice." He then added, "Why are all-European security structures needed? Because the bloc system was designed for a scenario of direct, face-to-face confrontation between the sides' armed forces--and confrontation at ever higher qualitative level of means of mutual destruction.... The blocs sprang up as a consequence of the cold war. They cannot remain the same when the cold war has become a thing of the past." He then identified the key political institutions of the all-European process as the following: the Council of Europe, the Committee of Foreign Ministers, and the institutionalization of the CSCE.¹⁴

The European construction process as outlined was tied to the German political settlement. "We do not think that this question ought to be approached exclusively from today's positions, the positions of current realities. The situation here will not remain static. Therefore, the final settlement formula ought to be geared more toward the future than toward the present, let alone the past." He then laid down some concrete requirements from the Soviet point of view. "The determining factors when we decide on our position will be: first, the dynamics of change in NATO's concepts and strategic doctrines and the degree of this bloc's transformation into a political-military rather than a military-political

alliance. Second, the pace and depth of the all-European structures, and, naturally, the Bundeswehr's military parameters. Third, the speed and scale of the creation of all-European structures and institutions, primarily in the security sphere."¹⁵

From July to December 1990

In the quote above, Shevardnadze referred to "when we decide on our position." In the July meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev, the decision was finally taken. The prelude to the July meetings was a June meeting between Shevardnadze and Genscher in Munster in which some issues were resolved. But the visit of Kohl to the Caucasus was the setting within which the final obstacles were overcome. The Soviet leader did not take his usual entourage of German experts and basically made agreements directly with Kohl. As the final details were negotiated, Kohl talked directly with advisors in Bonn prior to ensure as sound a German position as possible in his negotiations with Gorbachev.

By the time of the July meetings, NATO reform was underway with the July NATO declaration. The Soviet leadership insisted that this direct connection between NATO reform and German reunification was central to an acquiescence in German membership within NATO. As Shevardnadze put it, "The choice in favor of NATO posed a serious problem to us at a time when NATO stuck to its old positions. The forthcoming transformation of the bloc enabled us to take a different view of the changing NATO's role and place in Europe."¹⁶

Critical to the Gorbachev-Kohl deal in the Caucasus were three key elements. First, the Germans accepted an overall ceiling on their military forces of 370,000. Gorbachev asked originally for a level of under 300,000 but accepted the higher level. Second, the West Germans accepted the creation of special conditions for the territory of the GDR (not to have weapons of mass destruction, peacetime deployment of NATO forces, etc.). Third, the Germans would pay for the removal of Soviet forces from the former territory of the GDR.

In the minds of the Soviet leaders, the deal made with Kohl was closely connected with a general bargain with the West in which the Soviet Union would no longer be isolated, but rather become part of global development. As Serge Schmemmann wrote in late July 1990,

The agreements reached last week between Mr. Gorbachev and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany were not simply a Soviet-German deal, but the culmination of a long round of summit meetings and conferences involving all the Western nations in which Moscow searched for assurances of Western contacts. In the end, as Mr. Gorbachev repeatedly stressed at his news conference, what swayed the balance was not only Germany's assurances on the size of its future army or the upkeep of Soviet troops, but also the pledges from the West that it would not abandon Mr. Gorbachev. These included NATO's pledge to end the posture of confrontation, the promises from the European Community and from the industrialized nations to consider aid for Moscow.¹⁷

In August, the Soviets engaged in difficult negotiations with West German officials over the financial terms whereby Soviet forces would leave German territory. The negotiator on the Soviet side was the representative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and he rode roughshod over the Soviet military officials involved in the negotiation. Finally, a general exchange between German deutschmarks and a withdrawal schedule was agreed upon by the two sides. But there was concern on the West German side that a number of problems remained, and that the Soviets might come back later to demand a higher level of compensation.

In September, the final terms for a Soviet-German treaty were agreed to and this treaty was considered vital by the Soviets. The treaty would be ratified by the end of the year. In September, Shevardnadze underscored the importance of the treaty as signifying "a new stage" in German-Soviet relations. Among the key points underscored by the Soviets in the treaty were the following: it rules out the first use of armed forces against each other and also rules out providing military aid or other assistance to an aggressor attacking the other party; it grants respect for the rights and interests of each side; it underscores the requirement to have only defense sufficiency; to resolve controversial matters through bilateral consultation; to further develop the Helsinki process and to push for a new level of cooperation in the spheres of economy, culture and information exchanges.¹⁸

Above all, the Soviet leadership emphasized the important role the new Germany could play in the transformation of Europe and that their expectation of transformation was part of the bargain to create the new

Germany. This expectation shaped Soviet objectives throughout the 1990 decision making process. In June, Shevardnadze argued that "A united Germany will not fit the landscape of a new Europe if everything in Europe remains as it was before. In that case, German unity would simply amount to a boost of power on the side of one of the two groups which opposes the other."¹⁹ By July he argued that "A united Germany, with its ramified links with the West and the East of Europe, can become a pillar of a common European home. All European nations, not least of all Germans themselves, stand to gain from this."²⁰

Monthly Summaries of Evolving Soviet Views on the German Unification Issue, November 1989-December 1990

November 1989

Even as early as November 1989, the Soviets were using the image of the FRG "swallowing up" the GDR;²¹ this was an idea some Soviet commentators would persist in using for months to come. During the month of November, there was a great deal of coverage of GDR developments (mainly the political changes and the border opening), particularly by the key correspondents such as Lapskii (*Izvestiya*) and Podklyuchnikov (*Pravda*).²² Other important themes as well included an overwhelming rejection of the idea of German unification, some fears and concerns about German territorial claims (namely with regard to Poland),²³ and a strong negative reaction to Kohl's 10-point plan.

On the broad question of Soviet reaction to German unification, the assessments ranged from Yakovlev's balanced approach that the Germans would decide this issue, with no interference from the Soviet Union, to a flat rejection of the idea, including by such well-known figures as Nikolai Portugalov.²⁴ Portugalov stated: "I do not believe in reunification. I proceed from the fact that socialism is not negotiable for most GDR citizens. As far as national legitimation is concerned: Of course, there is no GDR nationality. There are Germans on both sides."²⁵ During this time, the Soviets were also careful to give extensive coverage to the position of the GDR government on the matter of unification.²⁶ In this connection, Bovkun, Lapskii, and Podklyuchnikov--all prominent correspondents on Germany--noted the GDR government's rejection of

Kohl's 10-point plan.²⁷ Other Soviet commentaries on Kohl's plan criticized it for not being serious and accused him of trying to dictate to the GDR.²⁸

December 1989

There was a great deal of Soviet coverage of German issues during the month. The main themes that emerged were: (1) that unification was not on the agenda, although there were volumes said and written about it, and (2) a considerable amount of attention paid to the internal dynamics of the GDR, especially by *Izvestiya's* correspondent Lapskii.

On the first theme, Perfilev rejected the idea of unification and cautioned about the threat of revanchism.²⁹ For his part, Afanasevskii argued that talk of unification was premature, and noted that the USSR and France were in agreement on this point.³⁰ Plekhanov believed that the unification issue should be up to the German people to decide and he supported Germany being demilitarized or neutral.³¹ Finally, Yurii Solton took issue with the position his colleague, Glazunov, had taken on the issue; the former argued that Moscow had always realized the German question existed and that reunification "is no illusion."³² Thus, it was evident that already a variety of viewpoints had begun to emerge on how to handle the German issue.

On the second theme, Lapskii covered such topics as the future of socialism in the GDR;³³ coverage and analysis of the SED, its congress and future prospects;³⁴ and one piece on neo-Nazism in Germany.³⁵ There were also many other analyses, especially of the SED and the political changes the GDR was experiencing, including by TASS, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, and *Pravda*.³⁶

January 1990

This month the subject matter on Germany ran the gambit, with no particularly heavy emphasis on any one issue, and not the same extent of coverage in previous or subsequent months. In the area of bilateral relations, Modrow, Genscher, and Kohl were all given the opportunity to discuss the importance of their respective country's relations with the Soviet Union.³⁷ Discussions about GDR politics frequently also contained criticisms that the FRG was interfering in this arena.³⁸ On the topic of unification, the tone became less negative. For example, Bovkun

reasoned that the process was entering a "calmer phase," and simultaneously noted West German support for perestroika.³⁹ For his part, Grigorev wrote that Kohl was now emphasizing a European framework for unification as well as wanting to expand Soviet-German economic cooperation.⁴⁰ These two analyses show quite clearly the linkage the Soviets drew between accepting unification and expecting economic benefits in return.

One of the clearest indicators of the shift in Soviet thinking could also be seen during Modrow's visit to Moscow. While Gorbachev continued to reject unification, arguing instead for moving toward a confederation of the two states, he stated that no one doubted that unification would eventually happen, but stressed the need for an analytical approach and responsible actions.⁴¹

Nonetheless, Soviet analysts and policymakers remained cautious. For example, TASS criticized Kohl's intransigence on the border issue,⁴² and a *Krasnaya zvezda* article urged a cautious approach to the unification issue.⁴³

February 1990

The main motif for the month was an acceptance of unification only if the new Germany would not become a security threat to its neighbors. Related to this was the question of a united Germany's membership in NATO, which was resolutely rejected. There were three particularly noteworthy articles which addressed the security dimension in February.

First, there was a lengthy article in which Valentin Falin rejected a previous report by Portugalov who supported the French model for German membership in NATO. Falin argued that neutrality must be understood more broadly and that the idea of an entire united Germany belonging to NATO is "absurd."⁴⁴

Second, in a rather surprising move, a session of the Soviet Foreign Ministry collegium issued a statement on its discussions of the German question. This statement rejected all options for German membership in NATO and averred that no other Soviet institution had the right to decide Soviet security policy.⁴⁵

The third noteworthy item was a discussion by Sergei Karaganov, an expert on Europe and member of the USSR's Institute of Europe. Karaganov's central point was that, whether the USSR liked it or not, unification would take place. He recognized that while the Soviet Union

had some cause for concern, there was no "significant danger," that neutrality was hard to achieve, and that it would be best to link Germany to as many organizations as possible. However, he continued, a united Germany's membership in NATO, was "completely unpalatable." Finally, Karaganov cautioned that unification was potentially unstable, and he outlined possible future problems, such as polarization in Germany, and manifestations of revanchism.⁴⁶

March 1990

Articles devoted to the debate about German membership in NATO made up roughly one-third of all the articles on unification this month, and the remaining two-thirds generally at least mentioned the security angle. Notably, there was a difference between Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's position; Gorbachev categorically rejected the possibility of Germany belonging to NATO, while Yeltsin argued that if Germany was united before the Warsaw Pact and NATO dissolved, then Germany should decide the membership question for itself.⁴⁷

Not surprisingly, there were many articles which flatly rejected Germany remaining in NATO, frequently arguing that such a move would upset the overall balance of forces in Europe.⁴⁸ Several military perspectives on this issue were offered in this vein. Marshal Akhromeev made several statements on the subject, his main points being that he rejected a united Germany's membership in either NATO or the Warsaw Pact; its options would include being neutral or belonging to another security organization.⁴⁹ Colonel I. Vladimirov wrote in *Krasnaya zvezda* that a united Germany within NATO would upset the military balance in Europe, that the "inability" of the Western European Union to control the arming of the Bundeswehr demonstrated that Germany cannot be controlled, and that a peace treaty would be necessary.⁵⁰

Several articles by civilian specialists further illustrate the divide in Soviet thinking on this issue. For example, D. Proektor argued that Germany did not pose a military threat and he advocated the French option for German membership in NATO.⁵¹ For his part, Aleksandr Bovin made the case that a neutral Germany would not strengthen stability in Europe, that the inclusion of the GDR's territory in NATO would not really affect Soviet security, and suggested that perhaps some Soviet troops should be kept on current GDR territory, even after its inclusion in NATO.⁵² Finally, Vyacheslav Dashichev flatly stated that

Germany could be a member of NATO; if the German government and people wanted this, no one would oppose it.⁵³

On more general treatments of unification, many Soviets continued to raise the border issue, and they also expressed concern about the rapid pace of unification (namely, that the FRG was pushing too far too fast).⁵⁴ Also, the need for a peace treaty was frequently noted, as was mentioned above.⁵⁵ Finally, many of the more general articles on unification included assessments of other countries' reactions to unification.⁵⁶

April 1990

The question of German membership in NATO attracted a substantial amount of the attention, although coverage of German issues generally was lighter than in other months. The main security theme was that it was necessary to ensure Soviet security and that if a united Germany were allowed in NATO, this would upset the balance (this was not a new position, it was developed over the previous month or so).⁵⁷

An article by Bovkun is worthy of note: he concentrated mainly on the military aspects of unification, cautioning that if a united Germany became neutral, this then raised the problem of U.S. and Soviet troops having to withdraw. Bovkun wanted to see both his country and Germany take a more balanced approach: "We must stop suspecting all Germans of revanchism, and they must stop being afraid that perestroika in the USSR will grind to a halt and go into reverse."⁵⁸

Also, the outspoken Dashichev outlined his ideas for options whereby Germany could remain in NATO. His stance ultimately led the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deny that he represented any official Soviet view on the matter.⁵⁹

Finally, Falin made the argument that a divided Europe presupposed a divided Germany, while a united Germany within a divided Europe would pose a threat to everyone. Hence, a peace treaty was necessary.⁶⁰

May 1990

There was heavy coverage of Germany this month. Virtually every article on unification mentioned the "military-political status" issue, with many supporting the idea of dual membership in the blocs, and many also continuing to mention the issue of a peace treaty. Numerous analyses emphasized that the old security system could not adapt to this

change (of a united Germany); therefore, there was a need for a new European security system. Finally, Soviets analysts frequently noted their concern about the rapid pace of unification.

To address some of these issues in greater detail, it should first be noted that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze gave an interview in which he indicated that the USSR would like to see a united Germany become non-aligned, and in many commentaries one begins to see a move away from insistence on Germany adopting a neutral status. Shevardnadze also raised the possibility of Germany belonging to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, an idea which many others then began to support.⁶¹

In contrast, Major General Batenin rejected the ideas of German neutrality, non-alignment, and dual membership in the two existing blocs. His reasoning was that the first two options would not enhance European security, and the latter was not useful since the Warsaw Pact did not have a viable future. Instead, he proposed political membership in NATO for all the united Germany, with the FRG retaining military status as well, but this military status would not apply to GDR territory.⁶² Batenin's position certainly did not reflect the position of other military leaders, such as chief of the General Staff Moiseev, who argued for a demilitarized and neutral Germany.⁶³

Once again, Dashichev became involved in the debate, apparently trying to bridge the gap between himself and the Soviet leadership. In an article in *Komsomolskaya pravda* on 15 May 1990, he noted Soviet concerns about unification as well as his support for the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze foreign policy line. However, the USSR's German policy was not following this line, and he believed that it was unrealistic to expect Germany to be outside NATO, which would mean NATO's elimination.⁶⁴

On the issue of the peace treaty, although Dashichev and others rejected the idea, others such as Valentin Falin and TASS's Aleksandr Antsiferov supported Gorbachev's call for such a treaty.⁶⁵ On another continuing theme, *Pravda* correspondent Evgenii Grigorev discussed the fast pace of the unification process, declaring that the West Germans were speeding it up because they were unsure of continuity in Soviet foreign policy.⁶⁶

Finally during the month, the draft treaty for Germany's economic union was completed. Most of the articles and broadcasts focusing on this dimension included assessments of the GDR's uncertainty about the

effects of this union and general problems associated with economic unification.⁶⁷

June 1990

In a month of light coverage on Germany, there were very few articles that did not deal with unification issues, and many of the latter continued to focus on the question of Germany's future military-political status. Perhaps the most significant shift can be seen in a statement by President Gorbachev, where he took the position that once NATO would change its doctrine and structures and would become a purely political organization, German membership in NATO could be accepted.⁶⁸

Two articles showed the continuing range of opinion on the issue of NATO membership for a united Germany. On the one hand, a *New Times* article argued that although the GDR was being swallowed up by the FRG, German membership in NATO had become inevitable and that this did not pose a new threat to the USSR.⁶⁹ On the other hand, Pogodin argued that the Western assumption that Germany would be a member of NATO was equivalent to a policy of Western diktat.⁷⁰

July 1990

July marked a very important month in the unification process with the Kohl-Gorbachev meetings (held in Stavropol, Arkhyz, and Zheleznovodsk), where they came to agreement on the key impediments to unification. Unification issues, especially the matter of NATO membership, were the main focus of the attention. Following these meetings and the resolution of the main problems, a new theme began to emerge as well in Soviet analyses: that Germany should act as the bridge between East and West.⁷¹

There was obviously a substantial amount of coverage surrounding the German-Soviet high-level meetings, not only factual accounting of the proceedings, but also analyses of the negotiations.⁷² Increasingly, Soviet analysts shifted to a position of accepting a united Germany in NATO. This was due, in part, they claimed to the results of the NATO Council meeting in London, which indicated a shift in NATO's approach. Although prior to this meeting there was certainly continued opposition to that idea.⁷³

Other items of note included the fact that Soviet analysts frequently liked to attribute the possibility of unification to Soviet policy, namely to perestroika. In other words, they argued that without perestroika, unification would never have been possible.⁷⁴ Nor were economic issues ignored (although they were certainly overshadowed by the security dimension). For instance, A. Kondakov explored the likely problems and impact that the economic union would have on the USSR.⁷⁵ Finally, many in the military particularly began to discuss the question of Soviet troops in the GDR, how long it would take to withdraw them, the problems with the costs of supporting these troops, and the need for the German government to compensate the Soviet Union for this expense.⁷⁶

August 1990

Not surprisingly, almost all articles on Germany in this month were connected to unification. Dashichev continued to pursue a unique posture. During this month, he outlined why unification benefitted the Soviet Union in an interview in the newspaper *Der Morgen*.⁷⁷ For his part, *Izvestiya's* correspondent Bovkun discussed the political effects of unification, namely on the German political parties.⁷⁸ As in preceding months, the Federal Republic's Foreign Minister Genscher continued to receive substantial coverage in the Soviet media, including interviews on the topics of unification and on Soviet-German relations.⁷⁹

The theme of Soviet-German relations was explored by other commentators as well in the context of reports commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Moscow Treaty between the FRG and USSR. One such article argued that there was no need to fear Soviet-German relations either now or in the future, a reference to concerns being expressed in some of the Western countries on the possible negative consequences of a close alliance between these two countries (with obvious memories of such collaboration between Stalin and Hitler).⁸⁰

Picking up on some of these ideas, the editor of *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Aleksandr Fomenko, explored the development of a Moscow-Berlin dyad, with references to historical parallels, and he saw a similarity in the two countries' geopolitical situations. He reasoned that the Germans could serve as an intermediary between East and West Europe, while the USSR would perform this same function between Europe and Asia. Fomenko also saw a new divide emerging—one between North and

South--and drew an interesting distinction between German unification and Soviet disintegration:

While the FRG and GDR are uniting into Germany, the USSR--to the sound of shouts about the need for a "new Union treaty"--is gradually being broken apart by separatists of all possible stripes. With the now obvious collapse of Soviet-communist ideology, it is becoming more, and more difficult, to maintain the military-political association of the "republics" that were created at one time to replace the unified Russian state in order to destroy its memory once and for all.⁸¹

On the economic dimension, the main focus of attention was placed on the horrendous state of the GDR's economy, including a recognition of the impediments to West German investment in the GDR.⁸² Finally, the problems of Soviet troops stationed in the GDR were addressed, such as East German opposition to their presence (including accusations that they have ruined the environment), the impact of troop withdrawals, and Soviet soldiers protests against being sent back to the USSR, the latter being reported in a German newspaper.⁸³

September 1990

Now that the main issues surrounding unification had been resolved, attention in the Soviet media was fairly evenly split between continuing coverage of unification and expanded coverage of bilateral relations. On the topic of unification, articles and commentaries frequently noted continuing concerns associated with the process, such as the pace and cost of unification, a belief that Soviet interests had not been well-represented in the negotiations, and a recognition of considerable concern among the Soviet public at large about unification (especially about NATO membership). In terms of this latter concern, most of the writings tried to assuage it, in part reasoning that NATO was changing and that the threat to the Soviet Union was not what it used to be, in part emphasizing the important economic benefits to be derived from cooperation with Germany.⁸⁴

In response to a question about why the Soviet Union withdrew its proposal for German neutrality, Aleksandr Zholkver explained the shift in the Soviet position in the following way:

I would not say that we withdrew it. It is just that in present conditions it did not meet with support. There were various reasons for this. Paris and London considered that German neutrality could spoil its close economic links with France and Great Britain. Washington considered that German neutrality would complicate U.S. relations with Western Europe. Among the Germans themselves, many expressed the fear that a Germany that is not a member of any alliance could become a factor of instability in Europe.⁸⁵

Other issues were discussed as well. There was also some discussion of the progress toward reaching an agreement with Germany on the withdrawal of Soviet troops.⁸⁶ The Soviets placed heavy emphasis on the initialing of the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Partnership, and Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and the FRG. In one interview, Gorbachev indicated that a grand treaty between the two countries was ready to be initialled and that they were making progress in coming to an agreement on German support for the cost of Soviet troops stationed in the eastern part of Germany.⁸⁷ Finally, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed the importance of the unification treaty, the fact that Germany did not pose a threat to the USSR, and the value and potential of Soviet-German bilateral relations.⁸⁸

October 1990

The most common theme this month was unification, although there were also quite a few reports of military issues. Before turning to unification coverage, Colonel V. Markushin published a notable article in *Krasnaya zvezda* which discussed the errors of Soviet analysis in predicting and understanding changes in Europe, including in Germany. Of particular interest was his assessment of the integration process in Europe:

The rebirth of a united Germany is taking place in the context of the economic, currency, and political unification of Western Europe. Integration is the most powerful factor for security, just as disintegration and the prevalence of centrifugal tendencies always involves the undermining of security and destabilization.

But integration could entail an excessive inclination to close in, and to transform the European economy into a kind of "European fortress," to use Helmut Kohl's words. This is fraught with the danger of losing the rapprochement between East and West that has been achieved. There is an awareness of this danger, it seems, among sober-minded politicians. In any case, many firm statements are being uttered on the desire to extend the European edifice to include all the new annexes from the East.⁸⁹

In terms of unification, Marshal Akhromeev's position was that unification was bound to happen sometime and that this was quite natural. He did, however, also argue that there was no need for NATO to exist.⁹⁰ Among other official statements, Shevardnadze averred that unification increased stability and helped in the formation of a new Europe.⁹¹

A particularly good article by a key specialist on Germany, Nikolai Portugalov, merits a brief review as well.⁹² In it he stressed that he trusted a united Germany and suggested that Germany should become a member of the UN Security Council. He also noted that the West Europeans thought (and some even hoped) that the USSR would impede unification; but, he argued, Germany could be the key savior for the USSR, namely to help it develop a market economy and save it from complete disintegration. On Germany's role in Europe and in shaping the USSR's future, Portugalov stated:

As of now Germany will gain a world political dimension because of its bridging function between East and West Europe as well as because of its contribution to the development of complete market structures in the East. At the same time, this is the safest way to prevent disintegration of the Soviet Union into 15 nuclear powers.... Only Germany will be able and want to make this contribution, not alone but in a leading position. Other powers, which also could do this, do not yet want to face this task--at least not at the required scope.⁹³

But at the same time, Portugalov also discussed the need to keep Germany in check:

West European integration also--not to speak of NATO, which is becoming obsolete--would be slightly too narrow a corset for the united Germany. Comparable with a complete insurance would be Germany's integration in world responsibility--for instance by the decision of the UN plenum to raise it to the rank of permanent member in the Security Council. In the meantime, it seems anachronistic to see the possession of nuclear powers (sic) as the only criterion of a big power.⁹⁴

On the military agenda, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Soviet troops, including the level of German compensation (a total of twelve billion marks, with seven million of this designated for the construction of housing for the returning Soviet personnel), but there were continuing tensions between the Soviet troops and the local population.

November 1990

While the official signing of the Soviet-German treaty received considerable attention for several days, beyond this reporting and general blandishments about this signalling a new phase in their relations, the attention paid to Germany in the Soviet media diminished considerably. While the treaty was initialled in September by Shevardnadze and Genscher, the formal signing of the document took place on 9 November 1990 between Gorbachev and Kohl in Germany. With this trip, Gorbachev was the first head of state to visit the united Germany.⁹⁵

Nonetheless, there were several items worth noting in the coverage this month. First, there was a lengthy article by Presidential adviser Vadim Zagladin in which he noted the history of the Soviet attitude toward unification and made the case that perestroika began this process. He also argued that unification was seen to be inevitable, but that the West was hoping for the USSR to stop this process. Perhaps most revealingly, Zagladin explains the logic behind the changed Soviet position on German membership in NATO:

We proceeded from the premise that Germany's unity was inevitable, that we should not interfere with it and that it was impossible to prevent its joining NATO, if it itself wished to do so. This meant that the practical task before our policy was

limited to one thing: to ensure the creation of such conditions and to bring about such changes on the European political scene that would meet as far as possible the interests of our country's security.⁹⁶

As indicated by Zagladin, as well as by many other Soviet commentators during the many months in which the unification agenda was being worked out, a constant theme was that unification would not have been possible without Gorbachev and his perestroika and new thinking. Soviet analysts constantly portrayed the FRG as the West's leading supporter of perestroika. The notion that Germany could be the USSR's economic savior was a central tenet as well.

Dashichev offered his assessment of Gorbachev's trip to Germany and the new bilateral treaty, and argued that in bilateral relations, the USSR and the new Germany must look to the future rather than concentrating on the past. Dashichev further noted that a divided Germany was the reason the USSR had not been "reintegrated" in Europe.⁹⁷

Toward the end of November, a new theme began to emerge as well, namely humanitarian assistance. Germany was seen as the leader of the relief effort, although other countries' contributions were (briefly) recognized.⁹⁸

December 1990

For the month of December, Germany's humanitarian aid to the Soviet Union and the ever-present theme of military issues accounted for most of the coverage. Unification and the treaty with Germany made up the remainder of the media accounts. With regard to humanitarian aid, Grigorev assessed German readiness to render this assistance, while others analyzed the problems of transporting and delivering the goods.⁹⁹

In terms of military issues, a protocol was signed on the agreement for Germany to help provide housing for the troops returning to the USSR and military officers discussed the progress in withdrawing troops from Germany.¹⁰⁰ Some of these commentaries, particularly by the military, also insisted that reports indicating poor (and even violent) relations between the troops and the local population were either unfounded or exaggerated.¹⁰¹

Finally, on the subject of unification, *Moscow News* published a public opinion poll conducted in the USSR assessing Soviet citizens' reaction

to unification. They were virtually split on whether they viewed this development with satisfaction or anxiety, and they were also split on whether USSR has lost what it gained in WWII.¹⁰² Displaying a more moderate approach to the subject, now that unification was a fait accompli, Manki Ponomarev reasoned in *Krasnaya zvezda* that Germany belonging to NATO did not damage Soviet security.¹⁰³

In short, there were dramatic changes in the Soviet position on the German question throughout the 1989-1990 period. But the Soviet leaders hoped that the bargain about the new Germany would provide them an important opening to the European integration process. It is to this linkage to which we now turn.

Notes

1. Shevardnadze, *Izvestiya*, 19 January 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-013, p. 13.
2. Shevardnadze quoted in Sidorova, *New Times* (1, 1990) translated in FBIS, SOV-90-011, p.9.
3. As quoted in *The Washington Post*, 7 February 1990.
4. Printed in *Pravda* on 27 September 1989 in FBIS-SOV-89-186, p.8.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
6. As quoted in *The Washington Post*, 26 October 1990.
7. As quoted by the *Associated Press*, 7 October 1990.
8. As quoted in *TASS*, 5 December 1989 in FBIS-SOV-89-233, p.48.
9. As quoted in *The Washington Post*, 19 December 1990.
10. As cited in *Pravda*, 20 December 1989 in FBIS-SOV-243, pp. 27-29.
11. As cited in *TASS*, 2 February 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-024, pp. 33-34.
12. *The Washington Post*, 31 January 1990.
13. *Reuters News Wire*, 7 March 1990.
14. As presented in *Izvestiya*, 30 May 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-104, p.1.
15. *Ibid.*
16. As cited in *TASS*, 17 July 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-138, p. 3.
17. *The New York Times*, 22 July 1990.
18. As cited in *TASS*, 13 September 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90, p. 179.
19. As quoted in *Pravda*, 23 June 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-122.

20. As quoted in *TASS*, 1 July 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-127, p. 2.

21. See, for example, Ye. Grishin, "FRG: What Did the Parliamentary Debate Reveal?" *Izvestiya*, 10 November 1989, p. 4 in FBIS-SOV-89-217, p. 37.

22. Articles by Lapskii are included in: "GDR: Seeing the Mistakes that Have Been Made," *Izvestiya*, 31 October 1989, p. 4 in FBIS-SOV-89-210, p. 41; "GDR: Dramatic Days," *Izvestiya*, 10 November 1989, p. 4 and "Seeking a Way Out of the Crisis," *Izvestiya*, 11 November 1989, p. 4, both in FBIS-SOV-89-217, pp. 25-26 and 28; "GDR: Changes Every Day," *Izvestiya*, 14 November 1989, p. 4 in FBIS-SOV-89-218, pp. 33-35; and "Policy Statement," *Izvestiya*, 20 November 1989, p. 3 in FBIS-SOV-89-223, pp. 19-20. Podklyuchnikov articles include "Extraordinary Congress to Convene," *Pravda*, 15 November 1989, p. 6 in FBIS-SOV-89-219, pp. 26-27; "SED: Preparing for Congress," *Pravda*, 17 November 1989, p. 7 in FBIS-SOV-89-222, pp. 22-23; and "Pen Portrait of GDR Premier Hans Modrow," *Pravda*, 20 November 1989, p. 6 in FBIS-SOV-89-224, p. 35. Other views range from those of Gerasimov and Kondrashov on the GDR changes (on BBC television broadcast, 13 November 1989 in FBIS-SOV-89-219, pp. 27-28 and *TASS*, 15 November 1989 in FBIS-SOV-89-220, pp. 35-36, respectively) to *Sovetskaya Rossiya's* assessment of the new GDR government: I. Osinskiy, "Will Quintet Play? On Multiparty System Under Conditions of Perestroika in GDR," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 18 November 1989, p. 5 in FBIS-SOV-89-224, pp. 37-38.

23. This, of course, raises the theme of German revanchism. For treatments of this issue, see, for example, M. Tretyakov, "Alarm Signals," *Pravda*, 2 November 1989, p. 5 in FBIS-SOV-89-212, pp. 36-37 and G. Charodeev, "What Mr. Teltschik Does not Like," *Izvestiya*, 12 November 1989, p.4 in FBIS-SOV-89-217, p.5.

24. In *Kyodo*, 15 November 1989 in FBIS-SOV-89-219, p. 24.

25. "Portugalov: Germans on Both Sides," *Bild*, 15 November 1989, p. 2 in FBIS-SOV-89-219, pp. 24-25.

26. For example, Krenz's statements include those carried on Moscow television, in *TASS*, and *Trud*, published in FBIS-SOV-89-222, p. 20; FBIS-SOV-89-224, p. 36; and FBIS-SOV-89-228, p. 42.

27. Bovkun and Lapskii, "Treaty-Based Community or Swallowing of GDR?" *Izvestiya*, 30 November 1989, p. 4 and Podklyuchnikov, "Plans for Engulfment Again?" *Pravda*, 30 November 1989, p. 5, both in FBIS-SOV-89-229, pp. 15-16 and 31, respectively.

28. See, for example, Nikolai Shishlin broadcast, published in FBIS-SOV-89-228, pp. 54-55; Yurii Gremitskikh statement, published in FBIS-SOV-89-229, p. 31.

29. Interview with Paris Domestic Service, published in FBIS-SOV-89-230, pp. 43-44.

30. Nikolai Afanasevskii, "Germany's Reunification: A Premature Problem," *Le Figaro*, 13 December 1989, in FBIS-SOV-89-242, p. 22.

31. Sergei Plekhanov on Top Priority television show, 22 December 1989, published in FBIS-SOV-89-248, pp. 3-4.

32. Yurii Solton, Moscow World Service broadcast, 11 December 1989, published in FBIS-SOV-89-238, p. 39.

33. V. Lapskii, "GDR: Appeal to Refrain from Violence," *Izvestiya*, 6 December 1989, p. 4 in FBIS-SOV-89-233, p. 41

34. V. Lapskii, "GDR: 8 December--Extraordinary SED Congress," *Izvestiya*, 8 December 1989, p. 4 in FBIS-SOV-89-235, pp. 24-25; Lapskii, "GDR: Questions Mounting," *Izvestiya*, 12 December 1989, p. 4 in FBIS-SOV-89-237, p. 31; Lapskii, "GDR: What Path the Reform Will Take," *Izvestiya*, 14 December 1989, p. 8 in FBIS-SOV-89-239, pp. 21-22; and Lapskii, "GDR: Extraordinary Congress Ends," *Izvestiya*, 18 December 1989, p. 11 in FBIS-SOV-89-243, pp. 16-17.

35. V. Lapskii, "Against the Threat From the Right," *Izvestiya*, 13 December 1989, p. 3 in FBIS-SOV-89-239, pp. 22-23.

36. See, for example, TASS's Vadim Chudov, "Morale Low Amid Turmoil in GDR," TASS, 5 December 1989 in FBIS-SOV-89-232, pp. 36-37; Yu. Shapkov, "We Are the People Too," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 10 December 1989, p. 5 in FBIS-SOV-89-237, pp. 32-33 and Shapkov, "Renewal Begins," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 12 December 1989, p. 3 in FBIS-SOV-89-238, pp. 39-40; and S. Baygarov, S. Zyubanov and M. Podklyuchnikov, "At SED Extraordinary Congress," *Pravda*, 17 December 1989, p. 8 in FBIS-SOV-89-242, pp. 23-26.

37. For Modrow statements, see "GDR People's Chamber Session: Government Statement by H. Modrow," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 12 January 1990, p. 5 in FBIS-SOV-90-011, pp. 39-40 and TASS, 30 January 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-021, p. 17. Genscher's views were published in: E. Grigorev, "Chance for the European Home," *Pravda*, 2 January 1990, p. 7 in FBIS-SOV-90-002, p. 29; "Prospects for Cooperation," *Pravda*, 16 January 1990, p. 5 in FBIS-SOV-90-011, p. 54, and in E. Grishin, "H.D. Genscher: 1990 Must Become Year of Disarmament," *Izvestiya*, 19 January 1990, p. 4 in FBIS-SOV-90-015, pp. 1-2, while Kohl was in E.

Germany, E. Grigorev, "H. Kohl's News Conference," *Pravda*, 12 January 1990, pp. 1 and 7 in FBIS-SOV-90-011, pp. 52-53.

38. See, for example, E. Grigorev, "Kreuth in Leipzig?" *Pravda*, 6 January 1990, p. 7 in FBIS-SOV-90-006, pp. 53-54; TASS' Albert Balebanov broadcast, 11 January 1990 in FBIS-SOV-009, p. 38, and V. Lapskii, "Election Campaign with FRG Involvement," *Izvestiya*, 18 January 1990, p. 4 in FBIS-SOV-017, p. 9.

39. E. Bovkun, "FRG: Nostalgia for the Future," *Izvestiya*, 6 January 1990, p. 5 in FBIS-SOV-90-008, pp. 54-55.

40. Grigorev, *Pravda*, 12 January 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-011, pp. 52-53.

41. As reported by East Berlin ADN International, 30 January 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-020, p. 21 and various reports on Modrow's visit published in FBIS-SOV-90-021, pp. 16-18.

42. Albert Balebanov, TASS broadcast, 3 January 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-003, pp. 29-29.

43. Col. V. Markushin, "Special Circumspection Needed," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 11 January 1990, p. 3 in FBIS-SOV-90-009, p. 7.

44. Interview with Falin in *Der Spiegel*, 19 February 1990, pp. 168-172 in FBIS-SOV-90-036, pp. 31-36.

45. Reported by TASS, 24 February 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-038, p. 1.

46. Sergei Karaganov on Top Priority television program, 23 February 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-038, pp. 7-10.

47. Gorbachev interview by Gabriele Krone-Schmalz and Stefan Kuehnert, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 8 March 1990, p. 4 in FBIS-SOV-90-047, pp. 27-28.

48. See, for example, Aleksandr Tolpegin, "Not Only a German Issue," *Za rubezhom*, no. 7, 9-15 February, 1990, p. 1 in FBIS-SOV-90-046, pp. 3-5; and Yurii Solton commentary on Moscow International Service, 19 March 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-058, p. 52.

49. See, for example, Marshal Akhromeev, "No Unified Germany in NATO," *Le Monde*, 30 March 1990, p. 4 in FBIS-SOV-90-062, p. 4.

50. Col. I. Vladimirov, "United Germany and NATO," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 15 March 1990, p. 3 in FBIS-SOV-90-052, pp. 6-7.

51. D. Proektor, "'For' and 'Against' a United Germany," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 28 February 1990, p. 5 in FBIS-SOV-90-043, pp. 9-11.

52. Aleksandr Bovin, Moscow Television Service, 3 March 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-045, pp. 4-5.

53. As reported in Hamburg DPA, 17 March 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-053, p. 39.

54. Illustrations of this point of view are found in: Vitalii Korionov, "Observer's Reflections on the German Question," *Pravda*, 2 March 1990, p. 5 in FBIS-SOV-90-042, pp. 33-35; "Statement by the All-Union Council of War and Labor Veterans," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 3 March 1990, p. 5 in FBIS-SOV-90-044, pp. 11-12; and E. Bovkun, "Bonn: Unscheduled Train," *Izvestiya*, 12 March 1990, p. 5 in FBIS-SOV-90-050, pp. 38-40.

55. See also Valentin Falin statement reported by TASS, 12 March 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-048, p. 4.

56. See, for example, the report by various correspondents, "The German Question--Where and How It is Posed," *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 17 March 1990, p. 3 in FBIS-SOV-90-064, pp. 21-23.

57. See, for example, Tomas Kolesnichenko, "But If You Take a Common Sense View..." *Pravda*, 4 April 1990, p. 5 in FBIS-SOV-90-067, p. 1, and Gremitskikh press briefing, 13 April 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-072, p. 3.

58. E. Bovkun, "Germany Between East and West," *Izvestiya*, 2 April 1990, p. 3 in FBIS-SOV-90-063, pp. 32-33.

59. As reported by Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network, 31 March 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-063, p. 34.

60. Falin comments on Moscow Television Service, 3 April 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-066, p. 11.

61. See, for example, USSR's People's Deputy Dzasokhov comments on *Vremya*, 3 May 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-087, p. 3.

62. Batenin, "Preferred Variety: All of Germany in NATO," *Berliner Zeitung*, 4 May 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-090, pp. 2-4.

63. As reported in East Berlin ADN International Service, 18 May 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-099, p. 61.

64. In FBIS-SOV-90-097, pp. 5-7.

65. Aleksandr Antsiferov, as reported by TASS, 11 May 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-093, pp. 14-15 and Valentin Falin commentary to East Berlin Deutschlandsender Network, 18 May 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-098, pp. 30-31.

66. Grigorev, "On Haste and Speed," *Pravda*, 18 May 1990, p. 6 in FBIS-SOV-90-098, p. 13.

67. See, for example, Viktor Levin commentary on Moscow Domestic Service, 14 May 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-095, p. 13 and May Podklyuch-

nikov, "Contract of Sale," *Pravda*, 21 May 1990, pp. 1 and 6, in FBIS-SOV-90-103, pp. 8-9.

68. Peter Vasilev report on 12 June 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-115, pp. 2-3.

69. Dmitrii Pogorzelskii, "The German Puzzle," *New Times*, no. 22, 29 May-4 June 1990, pp. 16-17 in FBIS-SOV-90-115, pp. 3-4.

70. Aleksandr Pogodin commentary on Moscow World Service, 17 June 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-117, p. 3.

71. See, for example, Col. General Nikolai Chervov, "United Germany Should Not be NATO Member," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1 July 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-129, p. 5.

72. See, for example, Grigorev's assessments in "What Will the Chancellor Bring With Him?" *Pravda*, 14 July 1990, p. 5 in FBIS-SOV-90-136, pp. 34-35 and "USSR-FRG: Post-Summit," *Pravda*, 19 July 1990, p. 6 in FBIS-SOV-90-140, pp. 31-32. Viktor Levin's assessment on Moscow Domestic Service, 15 July 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-136, p. 36. And S. Guk's assessment in "USSR-FRG Dialogue: Who Conceded More to Whom?" *Izvestiya*, 19 July 1990, p. 1 in FBIS-SOV-90-140, p. 32.

73. For those who say NATO membership should be accepted, see, for example, Aleksandr Bovin, "Signal From London," *Izvestiya*, 10 July 1990, pp. 1 and 4 in FBIS-SOV-90-132, pp. 7-10. For opposition to the idea, see Valentin Falin's statement carried by Hamburg DPA, 3 July 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-129, pp. 5-6. Portugalov shows a softening of his position even before the NATO meeting, where he allows that a compromise on NATO membership might be possible and that the USSR believes, in principle, in the idea of a nation's right to self-determination on the question of alliance memberships. See his comments on Moscow Domestic Service with Viktor Levin, 5 July 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-130, pp. 2-4.

74. See, for example, Aleksandr Antsiferov, "Helmut Kohl's Visit," TASS, 13 July 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-138, p. 9.

75. A. Kondakov, "FRG Plus GDR: A New Superpower?" *Ekonomika i zhizn'*, no. 27, July 1990, p. 19 in FBIS-SOV-90-140, pp. 10-12.

76. See, for example, General Vladimir Lobov's comments as reported by Oleg Moskovskii in TASS, 19 July 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-140, p. 28; Major General Vasilii Kazachenko's interview in *Neues Deutschland*, 16 July 1990, p. 4 in FBIS-SOV-90-140, pp. 28-29; and A. Krainii, "Crazy Marks Are What Our Troops Need to Leave Germany, and Absolutely Insane Marks to Stay," *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 22 July 1990, p. 2 in FBIS-SOV-90-143, pp. 26-29.

77. As reported by East Berlin ADN International, 13 August 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-157, p. 3.

78. E. Bovkun, "Farewell to Prussian Socialism," *Izvestiya*, 30 August 1990, p. 5 in FBIS-SOV-90-170, pp. 14-15.

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86. See, for example, TASS correspondents Konstantin Voitsekhovich and Aleksandr Kanishchev's comments on 12 September 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-178, p. 4.

87. Gorbachev interview by Sergei Lomakin on *Vremya*, 12 September 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-178, pp. 45-46.

88. Text of Eduard Shevardnadze's speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Foreign Affairs, by TASS, 20 September 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-184, pp. 20-23.

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90. Sergei Akhromeev, "Unity was Bound to Come," *Die Welt*, 3 October 1990, p. 8 in FBIS-SOV-90-192, p. 5 and Akhromeev interview in "Germany, the New Europe, and Perestroika," *Neues Deutschland*, 4 October 1990, p. 8 in FBIS-SOV-90-198, pp. 30-33.

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93. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

95. As expected, all the main commentators on Germany filed reports on this meeting, such as E. Bovkun, "Investments in the Future," *Izvestiya*, 9 November 1990, p. 1 in FBIS-SOV-90-218, pp. 18-19; and several by E. Grigorev and V. Drobkov, "View from Petersburg Hill," *Pravda*, 9 November 1990, pp. 1 and 5 in FBIS-SOV-90-218, pp. 19-20; "It Is Up to Us," *Pravda*, 11 November 1990, p. 6 in FBIS-SOV-90-219, pp. 31-32; "The Germans and the United States," *Pravda*, 14 November 1990, pp. 1 and 5 in FBIS-SOV-90-221, pp. 29-30.

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98. For a variety of Soviet coverage of Horst Telschik's visit to Moscow to set up a humanitarian assistance program, see FBIS-SOV-90-230, pp. 35-37.

99. E. Grigorev, "They Are Ready to Help Us," *Pravda*, 27 November 1990, p. 5 in FBIS-SOV-90-235, pp. 20-21 and interview with Deputy Foreign minister Ernest Obminskii, "We Need Transparency in Distributing

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100. Mikhail Voronenkov, *TASS* report, 6 December 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-236, p. 31.

101. See, for example, *Ibid.* and Lt. Colonel Yu. Alyaev, "These Are Happy People...", *Krasnaya zvezda*, 7 December 1990, p. 4 in FBIS-SOV-90-238, pp. 28-29. For one report of violence between the Germans and Soviets, see V. Zapevalov's article in *Literaturnaya gazeta*, no. 46, 1990.

102. Yurii Levada, "Social Barometer," *Moscow News*, no. 46, 25 November-2 December 1990, p. 4 in FBIS-SOV-90-238-S, p. 9.

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8

The Soviets and the New Federal Republic of Germany: Dealing with the New Europe

In the first part of this chapter, the themes presented in the specialized journals and press will be identified. Articles published in the foreign policy journals (*Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnaya Otnosheiniia* and *SShA*) are the special focus of attention. The period covered is from mid-1989 to the end of 1990. Articles published within a journal on a given date were, of course, written before that date. The rule of thumb is two months before publication but there are clear deviations from this standard rule. But this section ignores making judgments about when an article was published, and the emphasis is upon themes presented throughout this period, regardless of publication date.

In the second part of this chapter, some general conclusions are presented concerning the Soviet approach to the new Europe emergent from the debate about German unification. The main thrust of the domestic tendencies and their foreign policy consequences are identified and discussed.

Broad Themes on German Unification

In general, the range of opinion on themes presented in the specialized foreign policy fall into three categories: reformist, centrist, and

conservative. The differences in these positions revolved largely around how threatening German unification was to Soviet or Russian interests.

The *reformist* position focused upon how German unification was part of the general European construction process. Emphasis was placed on how Soviet acceptance of a united Germany within the Westernization process would be part of the modernization process of the Soviet Union itself.

The *centrist* position focused upon how German unification had to be inextricably intertwined with a new Europeanization process, neither Western nor Eastern. The Soviet Union must not be marginalized in the process of adapting to German unification.

The *conservative* position focused upon establishing very stringent safeguards against a resurgent Germany. The need to protect the Russian nation against German revanchism was underscored. The specialized foreign policy press largely saw a debate between the reformist and centrist positions. The conservative position was largely left unstated in this press but was evident in the military press, especially *Krasnaya zvezda* and in the political presentations of conservative Russian politicians, such as Yegor Ligachev.

The *reformist* position consisted of a number of key planks for the advocacy of reform in the USSR itself.¹ First, the damage to Russian interests which resulted from the "old" policy of confrontation was emphasized. The Soviet Union's old power position was eroding and a new foreign policy had to be crafted to deal with the erosion of the Soviet position within Europe.

A second plank of the reform position was the need for reform in the USSR to stabilize the European situation. The disintegration of the USSR would pose serious problems for European stability.

The third key element of the reformist position was an emphasis upon the continued viability of West European institutions, especially the European Community, in dealing with the future of European construction. The emphasis was placed upon the Soviet Union not only dealing with these institutions but trying to participate in the institutional life of the European construction process.

The fourth key element was an acceptance of NATO as an integral component of the European construction process. Several analyses underscored that NATO was not a threat to the Soviet Union as long as the Western democratization process continued.

The reformists emphasized the central role of Germany to the European construction process. By accepting German unification, the Soviet Union would be able to enlist Germany as an ally in Russian participation in the European construction process. By rejecting it, the Russians would only continue to isolate themselves from the Europeanization process.

One variant of the reformist vision was economic. A particularly clear presentation of this orientation was presented by Smol'nikov. This analyst argued that keeping Germany in NATO was preferable to neutral autonomy. Germany needed to be within the Western institutional framework to continue to develop in a multinational way conducive to a partnership with the USSR.

Smol'nikov underscored the significance of economic ties for the future of the Soviet Union. "For the Soviet Union and Germany...the prospect is opening up for creating an economic space from the Rhine to the Urals. In this space, many future forms of economic relations can be developed, including free economic zones, joint enterprises, and banks. A close interweaving of Soviet and German economic potentials could not only substantially transform the economic make-up of the Old Continent, but would also, in our view, be an important contribution to European security."² Smol'nikov went on to underscore the importance of Germany playing a central role within the European Community in order for the Soviet-German economic relationship to be part of the new Europeanization process. It is important "that the processes of unifying Germany not lead to a slowing down of the economic-political unification of the European Community. Only the full-blooded participation of Germany in formulating today's economic and political structure of the Community will reliably contribute to ensuring European stability and security."³

A second variant of the reform position was presented by Baranovskii. This analyst underscored that there are three new elements in the East-West dynamic: the crisis situation in the USSR, Eastern Europe's new reorientation, and the emergence of a new Germany. Central to dealing with all of these processes--and notably with their conjunction--are the European Community, NATO, the Council of Europe and CSCE. In other words, existing Western institutions are central to the resolution of the new East-West dynamics and should not be undercut by Soviet diplomacy or aspirations for a new synthesis.

For Baranovskii, the crisis of development in the Soviet Union poses a fundamental challenge to European stability. If the Soviet Union cannot reform and carry out extensive modernization, a new East-West divide will open up with Eastern Europe in the West and the Soviet Union isolated and stewing in its own backwardness. Europeanization is critical for the further development of the USSR.

The *centrist position* emphasized the importance of changing the European and East-West security and economic structures as the price for German unification. It was reasoned that the new Germany ought to be a motor force for creating a new synthesis in East-West relations and not the cornerstone for the Westernization of the East.

The centrist position rested upon an advocacy for a cautious and gradual approach to the German unification issue. Gradualism was necessary in order to ensure that the Germans and the West would build a security structure meeting Soviet concerns. As Pavlov put it, "Speaking of the need for a step-by-step approach, the Soviet side does not intend to somehow impede the construction of German unity, but, on the other hand, it does not see reasonable arguments in favor of it being artificially spurred on by someone."⁴

The centrist position advocated placing the united Germany within a non-bloc situation. That is, the united Germany should be neutral or the bloc-to-bloc confrontation must be altered with new structures to be created to deal with the new Germany. From this point of view, the centrist position about unification rested upon a long legacy of Soviet efforts to jettison West Germany out of NATO.

In other words, dealing with German unification became the policy problem leading the question of the future of European security structures. As Pavlov articulated this process of development, "Whereas before there was the opinion that overcoming the East-West divide might result in overcoming Germany's division, now the order has been reversed."⁵

For the centrists, NATO membership for the new Germany was unacceptable. Pavlov underscored why this was so in the following words: the membership of a unified Germany in NATO would lead "to an unacceptable disruption of the military-strategic balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and thereby to an undermining of the very foundations of stability and security in Europe."⁶

For centrists, the Westernization of the East through a unified Germany was unacceptable. As Maximychev and Menshikov put it, "A

unified Germany must not become just an 'extended FRG'."⁷ They added that "The Soviet Union advocates synchronizing the formation of a unified Germany with a positive evolution of the European process and the shaping of a fundamentally new system of European security to replace the bloc system. German unification should neither lead to less security for any country nor upset the balance of interests at any country's expense."⁸

For centrists, it was important to build new European security structures to encase the new Germany. For example, Major General Vladimirov and Colonel Posokhov argued that a European security alliance should be created through the reshaping of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Any European country would be allowed in and it would operate under general European institutions and the UN. They underscored the need for such a structure because "political, economic and financial European integration will not be able to succeed if it is not accompanied by the appropriate military-political integration."⁹

The conservative position was underrepresented in the specialized foreign policy literature. This is not surprising given that the major foreign policy journals were primarily populated with reformers and centrists. Nonetheless, the conservative position can be identified not only by inference but with regard to a number of specific comments made by conservative policymakers and analysts.

The *conservative position* was not specifically a rejection of the changes induced by the Revolution of 1989 (although reactionary voices could be heard to this effect). Rather, it was an advocacy of trying to protect Soviet interests directly through the negotiation of the terms of German unification. Whereas the centrists argued for a creative synthesis of East and West through the creation of new security structures, the conservatives were more intent on protecting the integrity of the Soviet empire (within the USSR) and the Russian nation. In other words, above all the conservatives argued for protecting the integrity of Russia from the assaults for German and Western influence within Russia.

In addition, the conservatives advocated a policy of little or no negotiation with the West Germans until they accepted a new security solution for Germany. For conservatives, the objective would be a virtual demilitarization of Germany, not simply armed neutrality.

One conservative group--the All-Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor and the Armed Forces--issued a statement in late February 1990, which underscored the concern for the impact of Westernization upon

the East. Events were going too fast and would undermine the all-European peace process. West Germany was conducting "undisguised interference" in East Germany's internal affairs. The West Germans were still pursuing "revanchism" and were unwilling to guarantee the post-war borders of Eastern Europe. German military industry must be converted to civilian use. Neo-nazi and "revanchist" organizations must be disbanded so that Germany would not be a threat. East Germany must continue to have its own existence within a German confederation. The organization then called for the Supreme Soviet to protect Soviet interests and, notably, to pressure the FRG to stop interfering in the internal affairs of East Germany.¹⁰

An important theme of Soviet conservatives was the impact of the unification process on Western influence in the East. The way the Gorbachev administration handled the German unification issue only led to excessive Western influence in the process. This criticism became even more strident in the wake of Shevardnadze's resignation in early 1991 as foreign minister.

But even in the early phase in dealing with German unification the conservatives were harping on the excessive Western influence theme. Notably in an article published in *Literaturnaya Rossiya* (a conservative journal) two days before the March 1990 East German elections, Alexandrov (a pseudonym for a high-ranking Kremlin official) argued that the four powers should dictate terms to West Germany in the unification process and not comply with West German demands for "swallowing up" East Germany. The political and military leaders of the Soviet Union have (with the other powers) the right to "exercise supreme power in Germany."

The article goes on to warn of the danger of "Pan-Germanism," which is associated with the FRG desire to change the postwar borders. The right of the German people to self-determination should be subordinated to the rights of Germany's neighbors for security. The Western allies--notably the United States--are especially criticized for ignoring Soviet interests and failing to cooperate to ensure that adequate safeguards against German revanchism are provided. The article goes on to argue that only a nonaligned Germany would be acceptable to the Soviet leadership.¹¹

Even after the deal had been cut for German unity, Russian conservatives continued to be critical of the Gorbachev administration. For example, in a series of letters to the editor of *Rabochaya Tribuna*, Soviet

citizens expressed "the lack of faith in the assurances coming from Bonn that the reunited Germany will eschew the idea of revenge." One of the letters noted that "The most real guarantee that the sad history of world wars will not be repeated would be the withdrawal of the reunified Germany from NATO and the assignment of a neutral status to it." Another letter stated that "My soul will not rest in peace...until the Germans of the future Germany reject the army and destroy the entire military industry, and Germany issues a law that metes out punishment for propagandizing war, revenge, and changing of borders."¹²

The most visible representative of the Russian conservative position during the year of unification was clearly Yegor Ligachev. Throughout the year, he sought to confront Gorbachev on various issues from the standpoint of representing a more conservative position. This included the major foreign policy subject of the year--the German issue. Notably in an important Central Committee debate in early February 1990, Ligachev directly confronted Gorbachev in front of the CPSU on the German issue. He argued that "It would be unbelievably short-sided and a mistake if we did not see a Germany with huge economic and military potential looming on the international horizon. It is time to recognize the new danger and to speak about it as loud as possible to our own people and party."¹³

In short, the variant positions on German unification were linked to distinctive views of the future European security order and the fate of the Soviet Union. Clearly, the Soviets were shifting from the luxury of framing a geopolitical foreign policy stance with little interference from domestic affairs to a spirited struggle over the future of Soviet foreign policy dictated by domestic concerns. As Shevardnadze put it just two months before his resignation, "If negative and destructive trends remain in this country (the Soviet Union), if the division of economic, financial and other state structures goes on, no international agreements will ensure our reliable security and peaceful life. Foreign policy is the continuation of domestic policy, and we should always bear this in mind."¹⁴

The Future

This book has identified and assessed the evolving Soviet approach to the Federal Republic of Germany throughout the Gorbachev period, from 1985 until the end of 1990. Soviet policy toward the FRG has been

a microcosm of the general Soviet policy toward Western Europe and Soviet assessments of changes in policy toward the FRG mirror broader changes in their policy toward Western Europe.

In general terms, since the early 1970s, Soviet policy has gone through three phases of development. The first phase continued into the beginning of the Gorbachev administration as it inherited the classic approach refined by the Brezhnev administration. In this approach, the Soviets gambled to win a bet: to expand their influence within Western Europe while undercutting Western Alliance institutions in exchange for the risk of greater West European influence over Eastern Europe. This bet rested on the ability to contain change in the East while promoting disintegration of the Western bloc. But for this bet to be won, the Soviet Union would need to contain a dynamic course of development.

By the time the Gorbachev administration came to power, it was clear that the Soviets were losing this bet. Notably, the Soviet model was disintegrating due to domestic pressures which were reinforced by an inability to crack the Western coalition. The Brezhnevites had succeeded in combining two failures: Soviet economic and political decline with encirclement by the foreign enemies of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev acted to try to reverse the negative course of history in the second phase of Soviet policy. He placed his own bet for historical development. No longer did the Soviet leadership try to work simply within the confines of the mediated relationship of Eastern and Western Europe. Europeanization and Westernization were moving too briskly for conservative management of a mediated intra-European relationship. It was necessary to announce a new synthesis of East and West within which "socialism" in the East would be informed by and influence the development of "capitalism" in the West. What I have termed the Strasbourg synthesis was the basic gamble made by Gorbachev.

The fall of the Berlin wall made it clear that the Soviet leadership had lost this bet as well, at least for the time being. Perhaps over the long haul Westernization and capitalism will fail in Eastern Europe and may never take root in the USSR, and the pressures for a new synthesis could then return. But the dramatic events of the fall of 1989 meant the end of the viability of the Strasbourg synthesis. Ergo, the need to develop a third phase in their approach, but the new phase would prove difficult.

Throughout 1990, not only did the Gorbachev administration have to deal with the German unification process and the explosion of political change in Eastern Europe, but it had to deal with the explosions of

tensions within the USSR as well. Suddenly the Russian leadership was faced with the twin pressures of Westernization moving East (to the GDR and to Eastern Europe) and the pressures to create a new Russian and/or Soviet development model as well. This book closes with the signing of the Soviet-German treaty of December 1990, but this treaty and the process which led to its conclusion are clearly not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.

One of the most important tensions for the future of European security policy will come from the different understandings the Soviets and Germans will take to the unification process. For the West Germans, the unification process was the culmination of a forty year process of change within Europe--it was the beginning of the end. But for the Soviets, the unification process was increasingly part of the struggle for the future of the Soviet Union--it was the end of the beginning.

Already within the effort to deal with German unification several different instincts or approaches emerged within the Russian elite and these differences presaged the struggles to come in the 1990s over the future of the USSR. Namely, the German unification dynamic saw further fragmentation of the Soviet elite concerning the future of their European policy.

For Russian *reactionaries*, Germany should not be united and Gorbachev "lost" Germany. The empire should be preserved at home and the handling of the German issue only weakened the internal hold of the Russians over the Soviet empire.

For Russian *conservatives*, German unification could be accepted but not in the manner in which the Soviet government handled the process. The Soviet side allowed too many concessions but even now the Soviet Union might be able to recover its influence in shaping the new European order through its alliance with Germany if the requisite approach were adopted. The goal in this approach would be primarily negative--to use German fear of Soviet military power as a means of ensuring German acquiescence in a more equitable (from the Soviet point of view) definition of legitimate Soviet interests within Eastern Europe.

For Russian *centrists*, the German unification process had a sense of inevitability about it. The process could not be resisted but only coped with. Especially for Gorbachev, dealing with German unification was closely connected with maintaining a viable central Russian or Soviet state. Gorbachev underscored his responsibility as head of state to protect the Russians from negative effects flowing from German unifi-

cation. The German unification process must not undercut the integrity of the Russian state or the Soviet empire. Accepting German unification was part of a process of ensuring the West's help, tolerance for, or acquiescence in the continued existence of a central state within the USSR.

For Soviet reformers, the German unification process was part of the broader Europeanization effort which the Soviets must join in order for reform and modernization to occur. For Shevardnadze, it was a visit to Brussels (to the EC and to NATO) in December 1989, which symbolized how he would deal with the German unification process.

But by the summer of 1990, the Gorbachev administration had accepted German unity within a Western context. At this point, the focus shifted to trying to define the new Europe within which Germany would operate. The Gorbachev administration seemed to insist on a number of conditions for the new Germany which it hoped would provide some Soviet levers for influence within the new Europe.

First, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze insisted on the reorganization of NATO. The NATO declaration of July 1990 about restructuring was hailed by the Soviet leaders as the beginning of a process of reform which must continue if the new Germany would not pose a threat in the future to the Soviet Union.

Second, the Soviet leadership insisted on the Germans paying a cost for the agreement. Politically, the Soviets wanted and obtained limitations on German forces. By so doing the Soviets could leverage the process of conventional arms control within Europe. Economically, the Soviets insisted on being paid to remain in Germany militarily during the transitional period. Developmentally, the Soviets demanded and received some economic aid for accepting unification.

Third, although these were short-term requirements, the Soviet leadership hoped to put in motion a long-term trend--the emergence of Germany as a lobby within Europe for the Soviet Union. With the emergence of the new Germany, its role would be augmented in both the EC and the Alliance. If German attitudes could be shaped to be supportive of long-term Soviet objectives, then unification would be worth the cost. This was the new bet being made by the Soviet leadership by the end of 1990. But Soviet leaders did not agree on the terms of the bet or the hoped for outcomes. For Russian conservatives, a more aggressive and explicit attitude would be required to ensure this, especially with regard to security policy. For Soviet reformers, security policy would be

downplayed to gain German aid in the Soviet Europeanization process. For Gorbachev, an ally would be needed to bolster his handling of politics in the USSR and he clearly believed that by making concessions to Kohl on unification, the Germans would become de facto supporters in Gorbachev's effort to maintain central control in the USSR.

A number of key items emerged on the Soviet foreign policy agenda concomitant to accepting German unification, and clearly Soviet leaders hoped the trends would reinforce one another. Above all, the Soviet leadership sought to enlist the Germans as allies in reshaping the European order.

From the economic standpoint, the Soviets encouraged the European Community to broaden its membership and to include Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Clearly, at least some Soviet leaders, notably the reformers, hope that the deepening process--the explicit integration of Western Europe--will be undercut by broadening pressures.

From the security standpoint, trends within the German debate against collective defense and for collective security were clearly encouraged by the Soviets. By highlighting the CSCE process, by encouraging the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and by signing the CFE treaty, the Soviets were trying--in part--to invalidate the need for a NATO reform which would revitalize collective defense in the West. Rather, they encouraged the process of transforming NATO into a collective security system by making it a more "political" rather than a "military" alliance. Clearly Soviet leaders were seeking complicity from key German elites in this process of transformation of Western security institutions.

But the basic ambiguity on the Soviet side about Western involvement in the future Soviet development model remained and was not eliminated by accepting the German unification process. The reformers hoped for Western participation in the stability of the Soviet Union--economically, politically and culturally. For the conservatives this is exactly what was to be avoided. To their way of thinking, the integrity of the Russian nation must be preserved against excessive Western interference and influence.

Was the acceptance of German unification a bargain for the Europeanization of the Soviet Union or for the protection of the Soviet empire against external interference? This critical question for the future of the USSR was only raised anew by the developments of 1989 and 1990. It will remain for the domestic struggle of the 1990s within the USSR to

shape a new synthesis of domestic and foreign policy to deal with the West in the future.

Notes

1. In addition to articles cited below, the main articles articulating the reformist position are the following: Yu. Borkov and B. Orlov, "Shto nam stoit obshcheevropeiskii dom postroit'," **MEMO**, no. 1, 1990, pp. 49-58; Yu. P. Davydov, "K novomy evropeiskomy poriadky," **SShA**, no. 3, 1990, pp. 42-46 (this issue of **SShA** contains several articles on the new European situation); Roundtable, "Edinaya Germaniya i ee sosedi," **MEMO**, no. 8, 1990, pp. 68-74; and Igor Maximychev, "German Unification," **International Affairs**, no. 10, 1990, pp. 36-42.

2. S. Smol'nikov, "Novaya logika evropeiskogo razvitiy," **MEMO**, no. 6, 1990, p. 28.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

4. N. Pavlov, "Germanskii vopros i 'obshcheevropeiskii dom'," **MEMO**, no. 6, 1990, p. 17.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

7. Igor Maximychev and Pyotr Menshikov, "One German Fatherland?" **International Affairs**, no. 7, 1990, p. 37.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

9. Major General Alexander Vladimirov and Col. Sergei Posokhov, "A European Security Alliance," **International Affairs**, no. 10, 1990, p. 81.

10. **Veteran**, no. 9, February 26-March 4 1990 in JPRS-UMA-90-11, pp. 55-56.

11. **Literaturnaya Rossiya**, no. 11, 1990, pp. 16-17 as analyzed in Alexander Rahr, "Conservative Opposition to German Unification," **Report on the USSR**, 11 May 1990, pp. 15-17.

12. Aleksandrov, 31 August 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-176, p. 7.

13. Don Oberdorfer, "Domestic Needs Outweigh Foreign Issues in Gorbachev's Platform," **The Washington Post**, 7 February 1990, p. 55.

14. **TASS**, 20 September 1990 in FBIS-SOV-90-184, p. 20.

Index

Akhromeev, S., 50, 185

Amirdzhanov, M., 87

Andropov, Y., 25, 29

Anglo-French relationship, 67, 76, 81-82

Anglo-German relationship, 67-68, 81

Bahr, E., 150

Baranovskii, 62-64, 68, 70, 72-73, 75, 199-200

Basova, I., 100, 110

Bergedorfer Gesprachskreis, 150

Bezymensky, L., 99-100, 110, 114

Bogachev, V., 57, 102

Bohme, I., 14

Bolshakov, V., 60, 76, 84, 108

Borisov, I., 106

Borin, 105

Borko, Yu., 86

Bovin, A., 116, 178

Bovkun, E., 129, 175-176, 179

Brandt, W., 153

Brezhnev, L., 8, 20, 25-28, 137, 141, 204

Bundeswehr, 42, 54, 71, 73, 102-103, 108, 111, 156, 173, 178

Burduli, G., 78

Bykov, O., 86

Cherkasov, M., 87

Chernyshev, V., 107

Chervyakov, A., 65, 77

Cheysson, C., 71

Chirac, J., 75-77

Christian Democratic Union party (CDU), 100, 102-103, 105-106, 112-113, 115, 129, 154, 171

Christian Socialist Union party (CSU), 14, 100, 102-103, 105-106, 112-113, 154

Churchill, W., 23

Comecon, 85, 157

Common European Home, 30, 43-44, 84-85, 87, 109, 121, 127, 130, 136, 138-139, 142, 149, 157, 160, 175

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 16-17, 172, 199, 207

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), 17-18, 207

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), 85, 122

Council of Europe, 121, 140, 172, 199

Dashichev, V., 121, 136-139, 178-180, 182, 187

Davydov, Yu., 69, 78

de Maiziere, L., 14-15, 17

Ditfurth, J., 155

Dobrynin, A., 152-153

Dual-track decision, 99

Eureka, 65-66, 68, 82, 85

Eurogroup, 48, 57, 59-64, 82-83

European Community (EC), 10, 19, 40, 59-63, 65, 73, 85-86, 110, 122, 128, 135, 139, 157, 161, 166, 168, 174, 198-199, 206

Europeanization, 1, 3-4, 8, 20, 30-31, 44-46, 48-49, 66, 70, 79, 87-88, 127, 135-136, 198-200, 204, 206-207

European nuclear force, 47